Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)

[designeraccd]

Here is the soon to be mothballed LC$ INDEPENDENCE firing a short ranged Hellfire missile. No doubt any/all Type 054A FFGs will turn and run........or "die" from laughing........... DFO

[Pelican]

Meet the Navy's newest unmanned helicopter
DAVE RESS, DAILY PRESS (NEWPORT NEWS, VA.)SEP 18, 2020 10:13 AM EDT

For 21 years, Petty Office 1st Class Timothy Egner has served his country by diving from helicopters and swimming through dangerous waters to rescue aviators and sailors. Recently, though, as a helicopter aircrewman, he’s been picking up a new skill.

That’s because this week, his Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 22 became the first on the East Coast to supplement its MH-60 Seahawks with drones — the latest, delivered this week, is basically a Bell 407 helicopter that flies by remote control.

Egner’s job on the new MQ-8C Fire Scout will be operating its radar and “multi-spectrum targeting system” — a souped-up camera that reads light, heat and electrical signals to pinpoint anything of military interest. He uses radar to spot what’s floating out there, and the camera to take a close look.

Doing that will allow the sailors on Navy ships to see beyond the horizon. And it means HSC 22, which specializes in operating from smaller vessels, including littoral combat ships and cruisers, will have more flexibility to handle the many missions those ships undertake, said Cmdr Matt Wright, the squadron’s commanding officer.

“A (MH-)60 can take a rescue swimmer to save someone, but the Fire Scout can fly 10 or 12 hours on an ISR (intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance) mission – that’s really hard on a manned helicopter’s crew,” Wright said.

After some 5,000 hours over the years in helicopters, Egner knows how a long flight can get you in the back — or as HSC 22 pilot, Lt. Ryan Jaenke put it: “Flying a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone) is easier on your body, but flying a helicopter is more tactile, more visual.”

It takes some getting used to, for pilots as well as aircrew, he said.

While Jaenke flies a helicopter with a cyclic control stick (along with four computer screens and dozens of dials and switches), all while he keeps a watchful, ever-moving eye on where he’s going. Jaenke controls the Fire Scout with a computer screen and push buttons, relying on its cameras to know he is on track.

A smooth move of a helicopter control stick that would, for instance, move it up and to the right, is a two-step operation with a drone.

It takes some getting used to, Jaenke said. But he has grown used to flying a smaller drone, the MQ-8B — a variation on the lightweight Schweizer S333 trainer helicopter.

The MQ-8C can carry twice and much and go twice as far, Wright, the squadron C.O. said.

When deployed, slated for next year, HSC 22 pilots and aircrew will fly manned and unmanned aircraft.

That’s what they’ve been doing already with the smaller drone and their MH-60 workhouses.

For the squadron’s mechanics, it means knowing — and being able to repair — the innards of three dramatically aircraft, said Petty Officer 1st Class Tyler Benkowitsch.

Egner, the aircrewman, likes the variety.

“It’s like, sometimes you don’t feel like shaving every day even though when you were a kid, you couldn’t wait to start,” he said.

He couldn’t wait to get started flying on helicopters. And after 21 years, he still likes doing it — even if some days, it means sitting at a computer screen and driving a camera with a joystick.

“Working on all these keeps life really rich,” he said.

From:
https://taskandpurpose.com/military-tec ... pter-drone
Via Tim.

[Pelican]

Future USS Cooperstown combat ship completes trials in Lake Michigan

MARINETTE, WI – Another future U.S. Navy warship has completed acceptance trials on Lake Michigan.

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 23, the future USS Cooperstown, passed several trials including a full-power run, maneuverability testing, and surface and air detect-to-engage demonstrations of the ship’s combat system.

Major systems and features were also demonstrated, including aviation support, small boat launch handling and recovery and machinery control and automation.

LCS 23 is the 12th Freedom-variant LCS designed and built by the Lockheed Martin-led industry team. The USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul completed trials on Lake Michigan in August.

Now that trials are complete, the ship will undergo final outfitting and fine-tuning before delivery to the U.S. Navy in 2021.

“LCS 23, like other Freedom-variant Littoral Combat Ships, delivers unique flexibility and capability to the U.S. Navy,” said Joe DePietro, Lockheed Martin vice president and general manager, Small Combatants and Ship Systems.

“Freedom-variant LCS are inherently capable, and they offer 40% reconfigurable hull space to evolve to future U.S. Navy missions. During acceptance trials, LCS 23 proved its maneuverability, automation and core combat capability.”

Continues at:
https://www.mlive.com/news/2020/12/futu ... Cl36PgdBmk

[Pelican]

Navy to Decommission Two LCS, with Four More on Chopping Block


Navy’s plans to decommission four relatively new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Congress granted approval to decommission two, the USS Independence and the USS Freedom. The Independence was decommissioned on July 29, 2021 and the Freedom is slated to be decommissioned on September 30, 2021. The ships are 11 and 13 years old, respectively.

The two ships were the first LCS built of two variant classes. The Freedom-class ships are 388′ long monohulls, while the Independence-class ships are 418′ long trimarans.

In its new budget proposal, the Navy wants to decommission an additional four LCS — USS Fort Worth, USS Coronado, USS Detroit, and USS Little Rock. The last two ships, both Freedom-class, were only commissioned in 2016 and 2017, respectively.

The decision to decommission four and five-year-old ships was attributed to “major propulsion train casualties.” Earlier this year, the Navy acknowledged that key propulsion machinery, the combining gear that links the gas turbines and diesel engines together on the Freedom-class ships, suffers from a class-wide “latent engineering defect,” that resulted in the failures in the USS Detroit, and USS Little Rock.

The Navy will be testing a class gear fix in September. Even if all goes well, it is expected to be several years before the repairs reach the rest of the fleet.

From - http://www.oldsaltblog.com/2021/08/navy ... more-57986 - which contains links

[designeraccd]

And if you believe this, I have a nice bridge for $ale in Arizona!

"“LCS 23, like other Freedom-variant Littoral Combat Ships, delivers unique flexibility and capability to the U.S. Navy,” said Joe DePietro, Lockheed Martin vice president and general manager, Small Combatants and Ship Systems.

“Freedom-variant LCS are inherently capable, and they offer 40% reconfigurable hull space to evolve to future U.S. Navy missions. During acceptance trials, LCS 23 proved its maneuverability, automation and core combat capability.”

These floating targets offer basically NO useful combat function despite their HUGE pricetag. Minor detail to the Pentagon mindset apparently.... BTW, none of the "modular" assemblies for these things work, so are not fitted. Therefore, for example, they have 0 ASW capabilities beyond the limits their helo might provide. One EXPEN$IVE helo "base". DFO

[designeraccd]

To further enhance the US deficit $pending; here is the LC$ DETROIT being launched in 2014. Apparently now scheduled to be decomi$$ioned in 2022. That will at least $ave operating costs for this useless target tub....

Also, a pic of her "mighty" main weapon a BAE 57 mm popgun......... DFO

[Pelican]

The First Littoral Combat Ship Has Been Decommissioned After Just 13 Years Of Service

The Navy plans on retiring more Littoral Combat Ships in the coming months, long before their official design lives have expired.

The axe has finally fallen on the first of the U.S. Navy’s problematic Littoral Combat Ships, with the decommissioning of the USS Freedom (LCS-1) after a less-than-stellar career lasting just 13 years, during which it was mainly used as a test and training vessel. The removal of the Freedom from the fleet continues a process of retiring these warships, which begun with the former USS Independence (LCS-2) being decommissioned on July 31, and plans are meanwhile afoot to potentially deactivate another three Freedom-class ships—and one Independence-class vessel—by March next year.

The decommissioning ceremony for Freedom, the lead ship of its class, took place yesterday at Naval Base San Diego, California. COVID-19 restrictions meant it was a closed-doors event, but it seems possible the fanfare surrounding the decommissioning would have been muted in any case, with both LCS classes having suffered a catalog of problems and the service finally having run out of patience with at least a portion of the fleet.

Continues, including photos and video, at - https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4 ... of-service

[Pelican]

Trio of Littoral Combat Ships Operating ‘All Over’ Western Pacific, Training with MarinesTrio of KUALA LUMPUR – Three Littoral Combat Ships deployed in the Indo-Pacific – USS Jackson (LCS-6), USS Tulsa (LCS-16) and USS Charleston (LCS-18) – have been operating on a high tempo across the region, the commander of the Singapore-based destroyer squadron said Tuesday.

“We’ve had LCSs operate in the region from Sri Lanka to Guam to Japan and everywhere in between. They have been all over the region with brief stops for fuel in Singapore, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Okinawa and Palau. We’ve had LCSs operate in surface action groups with destroyers from DESRON 15, integrate with the America Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) when DESRON 7 was the sea combat commander for the America ESG [and] integrate and conduct operations with the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group. And you’ve seen the integration we have done with the Marine Corps among others,” Capt. Tom Ogden, the commodore of Destroyer Squadron 7 (DESRON 7), told reporters on Tuesday.

See - https://news.usni.org/2021/10/20/trio-o ... 0hFIsnhgCc

[Pelican]

US Navy accepts first Freedom LCS since discovering widespread defect in combining gear system


The U.S. Navy is satisfied with the solution to its littoral combat ship combining gear woes, having accepted delivery of the first ship to receive the new system, service leaders announced.

The Freedom-variant LCS, made by Lockheed Martin at the Fincantieri Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin, has suffered several propulsion-related casualties over the years. In January, the Navy announced it would not accept any new ships from Lockheed following the identification of a classwide defect: The bearings in the combining gear failed when the ship tried to operate at full power, with the system unable to withstand the pressure of fusing max power from both the gas turbine and the diesel engine to help the ship reach speeds near 40 knots.

Continues at - https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/ ... yGOLO5EZGc

[designeraccd]

Here is a EXCELLENT commentary by a former USN SWO..........

LCS: History's Judgement Looms


The historical reckoning of the Littoral Combat $hip (LCS) that members of the Front Porch knew was coming since we started ringing the bell in 2004 is finally being written.

New scholarship continues to come forward with a fresh look in investigating the causes of and lessons from the LCS program.

There are firm lessons not just on how to run or not run a program, but also how perverse incentives hard wired in to our politics, acquisitions programs, and … yes … culture enabled abuse and wholesale institutional failure.

Over at War on the Rocks, Emma Salisbury is doing exactly that. For those new to the LCS story – and there are many – Emma’s article is a great starting point;

Uncharitably dubbed the “little crappy ship” by its detractors, the program has faced cost overruns, delays, mechanical failures, and questions over the platforms’ survivability in high-intensity combat. Each of the 23 commissioned littoral combat ships cost around $500 million to build, with astronomical operating costs adding to the program’s hefty price tag. While the ships themselves are currently facing the prospect of decommissioning and replacement, and many will not be sad to see them go, the program has one saving grace — it offers some important lessons about the American defense industrial base.
Bingo. That is why we continue to bring LCS up. It must be an ongoing lesson for present and future program managers – and those who will design future acquisition laws/procedures – as to what not to do.

(NB: the Front Porch of CDRSalamander claims 50.1% of the credit for popularizing “Little Crappy Ship.” Though it was first used in a post in early 2006, it was in use inside a few bespoke lifelines as early as FEB 2004 as evidenced by Bob Works CSBA article at the time.)

While close working relationships between the services, policymakers, and contractors can be beneficial, blunders like the littoral combat ship can undermine U.S. military capabilities while wasting resources that could be better used elsewhere.
Opportunity cost piled on top of opportunity cost. We lost almost two generations of naval development all because of the mindset that enabled this waste of taxpayer money interwoven with lost professional and institutional capital.
Network-centric warfare gave prominence to the idea of small, light, and fast “nodes” that connected together in conflict scenarios, and this meant that the U.S. Navy needed to move away from its traditional platforms — huge, complex, and multipurpose ships. Furthermore, network-centric warfare focused more on projecting power ashore, meaning that ships that could operate in coastal waters were required.
The seductive arrogance of NCW under its various names – so attractive as it would enable precise use of the 3,000NM screwdriver that has 4-stars second-guessing unit-level activity as opposed to doing their actual job – is a fragile pillar of whisper-thin alabaster that can barely be sustained in a benign peace. At war in a contested EW and space environment, its utility will be measured in hours and any system or CONOPS that requires its interface rendered useless.
…Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made clear that the U.S. military needed to improve its ability to tackle anti-access/area denial threats and project power in contested theaters. His office quietly informed U.S. Navy leaders that they needed to include a small surface combatant in any plans they put forward. The new chief of naval operations, Adm. Vern Clark, did just that.
Rumsfeld and Clark are the initiating force for all that followed with LCS. Accomplished men in some areas, here they were a toxic failure. Others who followed, most notably CNO’s Mullen and Roughead, just compounded this initial error of thought and execution.
A littoral combat ship would nominally have a core crew of 40 plus 15 to 20 extra for a given module, compared to a crew of around 200 for a similar-sized frigate, providing a much cheaper option when it came to crewing costs. Clark declared the littoral combat ship his top priority, and Rumsfeld approved the request’s inclusion in the Department of Defense’s budget submission for Fiscal Year 2003.
At the time, we and others warned that both the mission module and manning CONOPS would fail. There were zero successful examples – indeed real world experience was the opposite – that they would work as promised. It was all hope spot welded to pixie dust and leavened with unicorn farts.
In the summer of 2004, the House Armed Services Committee attempted to remove funding for the littoral combat ship from the FY2005 defense budget, citing a number of substantive concerns about the program: The committee continues to have concerns about the lack of a rigorous analysis of alternative concepts for performance of the LCS mission, the justification for the force structure sought by the Navy, and whether the program’s acquisition strategy is necessary to meet an urgent operational need. … [T]he committee is concerned about the Navy’s ability to resolve these issues before committing to the design for the LCS and beginning construction of the first ship.
There were smart people on The Hill who knew what was going on, but like the Front Parch, their argument at the time did not win the day.
…(in an effort) to tilt the downselect decision in their favor and to rally Congressional support for the littoral combat ship program as a whole. The company ran advertisements in newspapers and defense magazines touting their expertise and track record — including taglines like “Don’t just look at what we say. Look at what we do.” — and blanketed the metro stations serving Capitol Hill and the Pentagon with posters pushing for the littoral combat ship as a program, with slogans like “Littoral Dominance Assured.” Lockheed Martin also planned a trade-show style display in the Capitol, including scale mock-ups of the ship and its modules. The House’s threat caused a small showdown in Congress, as the Senate had voted to keep the littoral combat ship program fully funded. In the end, the congressional authorization conference committee report simply “note[d] the concerns” that Bartlett had expressed. The final spending authorization bill ended up fully funding the construction of the two littoral combat ship prototypes at a higher level than had been proposed by the U.S. Navy, the House, or the Senate in the original authorizations.
Marketing and spin works – even those laughable posters in the Metro. It all worked fine until, as we warned, these exquisite bastards born of vanity and hope started to displace water and try to deploy. By then however, retirements were complete, post-retirement gigs retained, political contributions gathered … and others were left to try to make something out of the mess.
…problems arise when the influence of the primes over policymakers leads to the acquisition of platforms that are unnecessary or simply do not work. This not only wastes money that could be better spent on other capabilities, but also impacts upon whether the United States can credibly face threats around the world. An expensive ship that cannot perform its mission does not bode well for the U.S. naval balance with China, or for America’s ability to project power and defend its interests in far-off and contested theaters.
Ignored and wished away. Compounded technology risk can and will result in a nation’s strategic risk.
Whether one believes the littoral combat ship to be an unmitigated failure or not, its beginnings exemplify the danger in placing too much emphasis on fears about the survival of the defense industrial base. While a lot has changed since 2001, it is easy to imagine the U.S. military making similar mistakes in future programs, and policymakers should beware of the ship’s example. The military-contract treadmill is still running.
Money. Ego. Status. When things go wrong, pull those threads.

LC$ had more to do with these, sadly, than it did building and maintaining the world’s greatest navy.

A EXPEN$IVE overall failure that we USofA taxpayer$ got to fund, and fund, and fund.........DFO