The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)
Posted: Mon Jul 19, 2021 7:28 pm
Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)
(Part 1)
Background
Following the disaster of convoy PQ17, the British wanted to wait until the darkness of winter afforded some protection before sailing the next convoy to Russia, so Churchill wrote to Stalin to explain this:
“My naval advisors tell me that if they had the handling of the German naval surface, submarine and air forces, in present circumstances, they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North Russia . . . it is therefore with the greatest regret that we have reached the conclusion that to attempt to run the next convoy PQ18 would bring no benefit to you and would involve only dead loss to the common cause.”
On being told of this, Stalin replied in his usual uncomprehending brutal way: “Our naval experts consider the reasons put forward by the British naval experts to justify the cessation of convoys to the northern ports of the USSR wholly unconvincing. There are of the opinion that with goodwill and readiness to fulfil the contracted obligations these convoys could be regularly undertaken and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy.”
Churchill later wrote in his ‘Second World War’: “I did not think it worthwhile to argue out all this with the Soviet Government, who had been willing until they themselves were attacked to see us totally destroyed and share the booty with Hitler, and who even in our common struggle could hardly spare a word of sympathy for the heavy British and American losses incurred in trying to send them aid.”
But there were scores of ships in the ports waiting for escorts, and there was also pressure from Roosevelt. Churchill above all was pragmatic, and Russia did need help. So following his visit to Moscow in August 1942 to confer with Stalin, he reluctantly authorised PQ18, to sail in September, and out of 44 ships which sailed, 14 were lost. The return convoy QP15 lost another two ships.
After QP15, the escorts were needed in the Mediterranean to support the Torch landings in North Africa, and would be unavailable for convoy duties until they had returned. Consequently, out of necessity, convoys to Russia were suspended until conditions became more favourable, although there were a few unescorted ships brave enough to make the passage alone.
The JW – RA convoys
It had become apparent that large convoys were too unwieldy and difficult to protect. As Admiral Tovey said:
“A large convoy . . . is likely to fail to keep company, and to split (as did QP15) into a large number of small groups, covering a vast area and unaware of each other’s position or composition. . . . Our own covering forces are always handicapped by having to identify a contact before they are free to attack. . . The splitting of a convoy into a large number of scattered units would greatly add to this handicap.”
It was reasoned that smaller convoys would be less difficult to manage and thus stand a better chance of survival. The Admiralty concurred, and what would have been PQ19 of some thirty merchantmen was instead divided into two convoys, namely JW51A and JW51B.
JW51A sailed with 16 merchantmen from Liverpool on 16 December 1942 and, with good luck and favourable weather, arrived at Murmansk on 25 December without loss. The return convoy would be designated RA51.
JW51B of 15 merchantmen assembled in Loch Ewe (NW Scotland) prior to its sailing on 22 December.
The Convoy (JW51B)
The convoy consisted of fifteen merchantmen; five British, nine American and one Panamanian. They carried 2,046 vehicles, 202 tanks, 87 crated fighter planes, 33 crated bombers, 11,600 tons of fuel oil, 12,650 tons of aviation spirit, and 54,000 tons of other equipment and supplies.
The merchantmen were:
Empire Archer (Br), Daldorch (Br), Empire Emerald (Br), Pontfield (Br), Dover Hill (Br), Chester Valley (US), Puerto Rican (US), Executive (US), R.W. Emerson (US), Ballot (US), Jefferson Myers (US), Vermont (US), Yorkmar (US), J.H. Latrobe (US), Calobre (Pan).
The convoy commodore was Captain Melhuish, sailing in Empire Archer, and the captain of the Calobre was the vice-commodore.
Convoy protection
The convoy was to be escorted all the way from Loch Ewe to Murmansk by the minesweeper Bramble; the corvettes Hyderabad and Rhododendron; and by the trawlers Northern Gem and Vizalma, both of which were equipped as rescue ships.
For the first part of the voyage from Loch Ewe, they would be accompanied by three Hunt class destroyers Blankney, Chiddingfold, Ledbury and the minesweeper Circe which, when they had reached the limit of their endurance, would leave the convoy and make for Seidisfiord, Iceland to refuel, before returning to the U.K.
Before the Hunts were due to leave the convoy, the escort would be strengthened by the seven destroyers of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla under Captain Sherbrooke in Onslow, with Oribi, Obedient, Obdurate, Orwell, Achates and Bulldog. These would sail from Seidisfiord to rendezvous with the convoy at a point NE of Iceland and escort it the rest of the way to Murmansk.
Providing distant cover would be Force R, under Rear-Admiral Burnett, consisting of the two light cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica, both armed with 12x6” and 8x4” guns. Force R had escorted JW51A all the way to Murmansk, but would sail to rendezvous with JW51B at a point SW of Bear Island and escort it through the Barents Sea until they too had reached Murmansk. Burnett would position his ships 50 miles behind and ten miles to the north of the convoy, which would give them the advantage of seeing enemy ships approaching from the south, silhouetted against the limited amount of daylight, while obscuring themselves.
Sailing from Akureyri in Iceland, Vice-Admiral Fraser in the battleship Anson with the cruiser Cumberland and three destroyers, would provide remote cover to the south of the convoy as far as Bear Island. This had the dual role of preventing attack by heavy German units approaching from the south, and interdicting their passage to the North Atlantic, should that be their intention.
Although not part of the escort, a line of submarines patrolling the North Cape were to report movements of German forces from Norwegian ports and attack if possible. They were Torbay, P47, P216, P223, P312, P339, Sokol (Polish), O14 (Dutch).
German forces
Because Hitler was convinced the British intended to invade Norway, a large number of the Kriegsmarine’s heavy units were permanently stationed there. In the northern ports of Norway, there was the battleship Tirpitz at Trondheim (refitting but available at short notice); the panzerschiffe (pocket battleship) Lutzow, the heavy cruiser Hipper and light cruiser Koln at Altenfiord; and the light cruiser Nurnberg at Narvik, all with destroyers in attendance.
Vice-Admiral Kummetz was given the task of devising a plan to attack JW51B (or PQ20 as they called it, unaware of the change of designation). Operation Regenbogen (Rainbow) was the result and the Lutzow (6x11” and 8x5.9” guns) and Hipper (8x8” and 12x4.1” guns) were assigned to it. They were to operate as cooperating separate forces.
Heavy cruiser - Admiral Hipper (Vizeadmiral Kummetz) with
Destroyers - Richard Beitzen (Z4), Friedrich Eckholdt (Z16), Z29.
Panzerschiffe - Lutzow (Kapitan zur See Stange) with
Destroyers - Theodor Riedel (Z6), Z30, Z31.
[Note 1: Lutzow was the renamed Deutschland, a sister ship to the Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer. Although always called a pocket battleship by the British, the Germans reclassified her as a heavy cruiser.]
[Note 2: The destroyers Z29, Z30 and Z31 each had 5x5.9” guns, the others had 5x5” guns, and each was larger that the 'O' class British destroyers.]
The escort defensive tactics
At this time of year, daylight in the latitudes the convoy would be sailing lasted only for about one hour when the sun rose to a few degrees above the horizon. For about two hours either side of this was merely twilight. Due to this poor visibility and the usual bad weather, it was not expected that aerial reconnaissance and attacks by aircraft would be likely. For the same reasons, U-Boats would have difficulty in locating the convoy as sighting reports from aircraft would be lacking. Also, it was known that a number of aircraft from Norway had been relocated to the Mediterranean area in response to the Torch landings.
The main threat would come from surface vessels, of which there were many stationed in northern Norway. Captain Sherbrooke had devised a plan to counteract such an attack on the convoy by a superior German surface force, which can be summarised as follows:
When a surface raider is first seen:-
1) The five ‘O’ class destroyers (5x4.7” guns) would leave the convoy and head towards the enemy.
2) The convoy would turn away from the enemy, with the rear ships dropping smoke floats.
3) Achates and Bulldog would steam a zigzag path across the rear of the convoy making smoke.
4) The remaining five escorts would stay with the convoy and reform the escort screen.
5) The convoy would continue to alter course so as to keep the enemy astern.
The five 'O' class destroyers would feign torpedo attacks on the enemy to force it to turn away before it could come within range of the convoy.
The only weapon a destroyer had to deter a larger enemy warship was its torpedoes. These were usually fired in a single salvo, but once they had been launched they couldn’t be reloaded. Essentially it was a one shot weapon and, having used them, the destroyer would no longer present a credible threat. Thus it was essential to preserve the torpedoes as long as possible.
From the enemy’s viewpoint, it was not possible to deduce whether a destroyer approaching for an apparent torpedo attack actually intended to launch its torpedoes. In the twilight conditions that existed, it would be difficult to see if they had actually been launched. While a single attacking vessel could probably be dealt with before it came within range, an attack by several destroyers probably couldn’t. The only safe option was to make a defensive turn away to comb the expected torpedo tracks.
This is what Sherbrooke expected and relied upon for his plan to work. Feigned attacks were necessary to preserve the torpedo threat for as long as possible, as the enemy was sure to make repeated attempts to get at the convoy.
The German plan of attack
German heavy units operated at sea under restrictions imposed upon them by Hitler. They were not allowed to engage an equal or superior force, nor were night time actions in which enemy destroyers were present permitted for fear of torpedo attack. Consequently, Kummetz had to time his attack to coincide with the only two and a half hours of dim light available at those high latitudes.
Operation Rainbow would begin only when JW51B had been sighted, its position and course established, and when permission was received. Only then would Vice-Admiral Kummetz in the Hipper with her three destroyers, sail from Altenfiord, followed by Lutzow with her three destroyers.
Kummetz, intended to sweep along the convoy’s track from west to east in the morning so that it would be silhouetted against what little morning light there was coming from the east. On sighting the convoy, Hipper would attack its north flank, drawing off the escorts northwards. Kummetz reasoned that the convoy would then turn away to the south, from which direction Lutzow would be approaching. Lutzow would then have a free hand to get among the merchantmen unhindered by the escorts.
It was a classic pincer attack, which if accomplished, would nullify Sherbrooke’s tactics which defended the convoy against an attack from one direction only. But there would be operational difficulties in coordinating the attack as the two forces, would be operating out of sight of each other and maintaining radio silence. And then there was the weather.
Prelude
JW51B sailed from Loch Ewe in the afternoon of Tuesday 22 December. The merchantmen started in single file, then gradually formed up into a four deep by four wide convoy sailing NNW at about 8 knots with their escort. Sherbrooke in Onslow followed soon afterwards as fast as conditions allowed, bound for Seidisfiord where the other destroyers of the 17th Flotilla had proceeded independently. There they would refuel before rejoining the convoy.
The destoyers Bulldog and Achates, having departed independently from Gourock the previous day, were being battered by a force 9 southerly gale which soon became a force 12 storm, forcing them to heave to. Bulldog was so damaged that she was forced to return for repairs, while Achates, although damaged, made it to Seidisfiord where she was repaired in time.
Next day, the convoy was also battered by the same bad weather and lost formation. The Dover Hill had to turn back damaged and with boiler trouble.
At 23.00 on 24 December, the 17th Destroyer Flotilla, now with only six ships, sailed from Seidisfiord to rendezvous with the convoy currently 150 miles to the east, which was sighted the next day at about 14.30. They took up their positions and the Hunts were sent to round up the stragglers, after which the convoy changed course to the NE. In the evening, the three Hunt class destroyers and the minesweeper Circe left the convoy to return - their part of the job was over.
On the 26th, Vice-Admiral Fraser in the battleship Anson, with Cumberland and three destroyers sailed from Akureyri, Iceland to take up a remote patrol line south of the convoy's route.
On the 27th, Rear-Admiral Burnett with Force R sailed from Murmansk.
-----“-----
(to be continued)
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)
(Part 1)
Background
Following the disaster of convoy PQ17, the British wanted to wait until the darkness of winter afforded some protection before sailing the next convoy to Russia, so Churchill wrote to Stalin to explain this:
“My naval advisors tell me that if they had the handling of the German naval surface, submarine and air forces, in present circumstances, they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North Russia . . . it is therefore with the greatest regret that we have reached the conclusion that to attempt to run the next convoy PQ18 would bring no benefit to you and would involve only dead loss to the common cause.”
On being told of this, Stalin replied in his usual uncomprehending brutal way: “Our naval experts consider the reasons put forward by the British naval experts to justify the cessation of convoys to the northern ports of the USSR wholly unconvincing. There are of the opinion that with goodwill and readiness to fulfil the contracted obligations these convoys could be regularly undertaken and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy.”
Churchill later wrote in his ‘Second World War’: “I did not think it worthwhile to argue out all this with the Soviet Government, who had been willing until they themselves were attacked to see us totally destroyed and share the booty with Hitler, and who even in our common struggle could hardly spare a word of sympathy for the heavy British and American losses incurred in trying to send them aid.”
But there were scores of ships in the ports waiting for escorts, and there was also pressure from Roosevelt. Churchill above all was pragmatic, and Russia did need help. So following his visit to Moscow in August 1942 to confer with Stalin, he reluctantly authorised PQ18, to sail in September, and out of 44 ships which sailed, 14 were lost. The return convoy QP15 lost another two ships.
After QP15, the escorts were needed in the Mediterranean to support the Torch landings in North Africa, and would be unavailable for convoy duties until they had returned. Consequently, out of necessity, convoys to Russia were suspended until conditions became more favourable, although there were a few unescorted ships brave enough to make the passage alone.
The JW – RA convoys
It had become apparent that large convoys were too unwieldy and difficult to protect. As Admiral Tovey said:
“A large convoy . . . is likely to fail to keep company, and to split (as did QP15) into a large number of small groups, covering a vast area and unaware of each other’s position or composition. . . . Our own covering forces are always handicapped by having to identify a contact before they are free to attack. . . The splitting of a convoy into a large number of scattered units would greatly add to this handicap.”
It was reasoned that smaller convoys would be less difficult to manage and thus stand a better chance of survival. The Admiralty concurred, and what would have been PQ19 of some thirty merchantmen was instead divided into two convoys, namely JW51A and JW51B.
JW51A sailed with 16 merchantmen from Liverpool on 16 December 1942 and, with good luck and favourable weather, arrived at Murmansk on 25 December without loss. The return convoy would be designated RA51.
JW51B of 15 merchantmen assembled in Loch Ewe (NW Scotland) prior to its sailing on 22 December.
The Convoy (JW51B)
The convoy consisted of fifteen merchantmen; five British, nine American and one Panamanian. They carried 2,046 vehicles, 202 tanks, 87 crated fighter planes, 33 crated bombers, 11,600 tons of fuel oil, 12,650 tons of aviation spirit, and 54,000 tons of other equipment and supplies.
The merchantmen were:
Empire Archer (Br), Daldorch (Br), Empire Emerald (Br), Pontfield (Br), Dover Hill (Br), Chester Valley (US), Puerto Rican (US), Executive (US), R.W. Emerson (US), Ballot (US), Jefferson Myers (US), Vermont (US), Yorkmar (US), J.H. Latrobe (US), Calobre (Pan).
The convoy commodore was Captain Melhuish, sailing in Empire Archer, and the captain of the Calobre was the vice-commodore.
Convoy protection
The convoy was to be escorted all the way from Loch Ewe to Murmansk by the minesweeper Bramble; the corvettes Hyderabad and Rhododendron; and by the trawlers Northern Gem and Vizalma, both of which were equipped as rescue ships.
For the first part of the voyage from Loch Ewe, they would be accompanied by three Hunt class destroyers Blankney, Chiddingfold, Ledbury and the minesweeper Circe which, when they had reached the limit of their endurance, would leave the convoy and make for Seidisfiord, Iceland to refuel, before returning to the U.K.
Before the Hunts were due to leave the convoy, the escort would be strengthened by the seven destroyers of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla under Captain Sherbrooke in Onslow, with Oribi, Obedient, Obdurate, Orwell, Achates and Bulldog. These would sail from Seidisfiord to rendezvous with the convoy at a point NE of Iceland and escort it the rest of the way to Murmansk.
Providing distant cover would be Force R, under Rear-Admiral Burnett, consisting of the two light cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica, both armed with 12x6” and 8x4” guns. Force R had escorted JW51A all the way to Murmansk, but would sail to rendezvous with JW51B at a point SW of Bear Island and escort it through the Barents Sea until they too had reached Murmansk. Burnett would position his ships 50 miles behind and ten miles to the north of the convoy, which would give them the advantage of seeing enemy ships approaching from the south, silhouetted against the limited amount of daylight, while obscuring themselves.
Sailing from Akureyri in Iceland, Vice-Admiral Fraser in the battleship Anson with the cruiser Cumberland and three destroyers, would provide remote cover to the south of the convoy as far as Bear Island. This had the dual role of preventing attack by heavy German units approaching from the south, and interdicting their passage to the North Atlantic, should that be their intention.
Although not part of the escort, a line of submarines patrolling the North Cape were to report movements of German forces from Norwegian ports and attack if possible. They were Torbay, P47, P216, P223, P312, P339, Sokol (Polish), O14 (Dutch).
German forces
Because Hitler was convinced the British intended to invade Norway, a large number of the Kriegsmarine’s heavy units were permanently stationed there. In the northern ports of Norway, there was the battleship Tirpitz at Trondheim (refitting but available at short notice); the panzerschiffe (pocket battleship) Lutzow, the heavy cruiser Hipper and light cruiser Koln at Altenfiord; and the light cruiser Nurnberg at Narvik, all with destroyers in attendance.
Vice-Admiral Kummetz was given the task of devising a plan to attack JW51B (or PQ20 as they called it, unaware of the change of designation). Operation Regenbogen (Rainbow) was the result and the Lutzow (6x11” and 8x5.9” guns) and Hipper (8x8” and 12x4.1” guns) were assigned to it. They were to operate as cooperating separate forces.
Heavy cruiser - Admiral Hipper (Vizeadmiral Kummetz) with
Destroyers - Richard Beitzen (Z4), Friedrich Eckholdt (Z16), Z29.
Panzerschiffe - Lutzow (Kapitan zur See Stange) with
Destroyers - Theodor Riedel (Z6), Z30, Z31.
[Note 1: Lutzow was the renamed Deutschland, a sister ship to the Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer. Although always called a pocket battleship by the British, the Germans reclassified her as a heavy cruiser.]
[Note 2: The destroyers Z29, Z30 and Z31 each had 5x5.9” guns, the others had 5x5” guns, and each was larger that the 'O' class British destroyers.]
The escort defensive tactics
At this time of year, daylight in the latitudes the convoy would be sailing lasted only for about one hour when the sun rose to a few degrees above the horizon. For about two hours either side of this was merely twilight. Due to this poor visibility and the usual bad weather, it was not expected that aerial reconnaissance and attacks by aircraft would be likely. For the same reasons, U-Boats would have difficulty in locating the convoy as sighting reports from aircraft would be lacking. Also, it was known that a number of aircraft from Norway had been relocated to the Mediterranean area in response to the Torch landings.
The main threat would come from surface vessels, of which there were many stationed in northern Norway. Captain Sherbrooke had devised a plan to counteract such an attack on the convoy by a superior German surface force, which can be summarised as follows:
When a surface raider is first seen:-
1) The five ‘O’ class destroyers (5x4.7” guns) would leave the convoy and head towards the enemy.
2) The convoy would turn away from the enemy, with the rear ships dropping smoke floats.
3) Achates and Bulldog would steam a zigzag path across the rear of the convoy making smoke.
4) The remaining five escorts would stay with the convoy and reform the escort screen.
5) The convoy would continue to alter course so as to keep the enemy astern.
The five 'O' class destroyers would feign torpedo attacks on the enemy to force it to turn away before it could come within range of the convoy.
The only weapon a destroyer had to deter a larger enemy warship was its torpedoes. These were usually fired in a single salvo, but once they had been launched they couldn’t be reloaded. Essentially it was a one shot weapon and, having used them, the destroyer would no longer present a credible threat. Thus it was essential to preserve the torpedoes as long as possible.
From the enemy’s viewpoint, it was not possible to deduce whether a destroyer approaching for an apparent torpedo attack actually intended to launch its torpedoes. In the twilight conditions that existed, it would be difficult to see if they had actually been launched. While a single attacking vessel could probably be dealt with before it came within range, an attack by several destroyers probably couldn’t. The only safe option was to make a defensive turn away to comb the expected torpedo tracks.
This is what Sherbrooke expected and relied upon for his plan to work. Feigned attacks were necessary to preserve the torpedo threat for as long as possible, as the enemy was sure to make repeated attempts to get at the convoy.
The German plan of attack
German heavy units operated at sea under restrictions imposed upon them by Hitler. They were not allowed to engage an equal or superior force, nor were night time actions in which enemy destroyers were present permitted for fear of torpedo attack. Consequently, Kummetz had to time his attack to coincide with the only two and a half hours of dim light available at those high latitudes.
Operation Rainbow would begin only when JW51B had been sighted, its position and course established, and when permission was received. Only then would Vice-Admiral Kummetz in the Hipper with her three destroyers, sail from Altenfiord, followed by Lutzow with her three destroyers.
Kummetz, intended to sweep along the convoy’s track from west to east in the morning so that it would be silhouetted against what little morning light there was coming from the east. On sighting the convoy, Hipper would attack its north flank, drawing off the escorts northwards. Kummetz reasoned that the convoy would then turn away to the south, from which direction Lutzow would be approaching. Lutzow would then have a free hand to get among the merchantmen unhindered by the escorts.
It was a classic pincer attack, which if accomplished, would nullify Sherbrooke’s tactics which defended the convoy against an attack from one direction only. But there would be operational difficulties in coordinating the attack as the two forces, would be operating out of sight of each other and maintaining radio silence. And then there was the weather.
Prelude
JW51B sailed from Loch Ewe in the afternoon of Tuesday 22 December. The merchantmen started in single file, then gradually formed up into a four deep by four wide convoy sailing NNW at about 8 knots with their escort. Sherbrooke in Onslow followed soon afterwards as fast as conditions allowed, bound for Seidisfiord where the other destroyers of the 17th Flotilla had proceeded independently. There they would refuel before rejoining the convoy.
The destoyers Bulldog and Achates, having departed independently from Gourock the previous day, were being battered by a force 9 southerly gale which soon became a force 12 storm, forcing them to heave to. Bulldog was so damaged that she was forced to return for repairs, while Achates, although damaged, made it to Seidisfiord where she was repaired in time.
Next day, the convoy was also battered by the same bad weather and lost formation. The Dover Hill had to turn back damaged and with boiler trouble.
At 23.00 on 24 December, the 17th Destroyer Flotilla, now with only six ships, sailed from Seidisfiord to rendezvous with the convoy currently 150 miles to the east, which was sighted the next day at about 14.30. They took up their positions and the Hunts were sent to round up the stragglers, after which the convoy changed course to the NE. In the evening, the three Hunt class destroyers and the minesweeper Circe left the convoy to return - their part of the job was over.
On the 26th, Vice-Admiral Fraser in the battleship Anson, with Cumberland and three destroyers sailed from Akureyri, Iceland to take up a remote patrol line south of the convoy's route.
On the 27th, Rear-Admiral Burnett with Force R sailed from Murmansk.
-----“-----
(to be continued)