The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

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The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

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Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)


(Part 1)

Background
Following the disaster of convoy PQ17, the British wanted to wait until the darkness of winter afforded some protection before sailing the next convoy to Russia, so Churchill wrote to Stalin to explain this:

My naval advisors tell me that if they had the handling of the German naval surface, submarine and air forces, in present circumstances, they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North Russia . . . it is therefore with the greatest regret that we have reached the conclusion that to attempt to run the next convoy PQ18 would bring no benefit to you and would involve only dead loss to the common cause.”

On being told of this, Stalin replied in his usual uncomprehending brutal way: “Our naval experts consider the reasons put forward by the British naval experts to justify the cessation of convoys to the northern ports of the USSR wholly unconvincing. There are of the opinion that with goodwill and readiness to fulfil the contracted obligations these convoys could be regularly undertaken and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy.”

Churchill later wrote in his ‘Second World War’: “I did not think it worthwhile to argue out all this with the Soviet Government, who had been willing until they themselves were attacked to see us totally destroyed and share the booty with Hitler, and who even in our common struggle could hardly spare a word of sympathy for the heavy British and American losses incurred in trying to send them aid.”

But there were scores of ships in the ports waiting for escorts, and there was also pressure from Roosevelt. Churchill above all was pragmatic, and Russia did need help. So following his visit to Moscow in August 1942 to confer with Stalin, he reluctantly authorised PQ18, to sail in September, and out of 44 ships which sailed, 14 were lost. The return convoy QP15 lost another two ships.

After QP15, the escorts were needed in the Mediterranean to support the Torch landings in North Africa, and would be unavailable for convoy duties until they had returned. Consequently, out of necessity, convoys to Russia were suspended until conditions became more favourable, although there were a few unescorted ships brave enough to make the passage alone.


The JW – RA convoys
It had become apparent that large convoys were too unwieldy and difficult to protect. As Admiral Tovey said:
“A large convoy . . . is likely to fail to keep company, and to split (as did QP15) into a large number of small groups, covering a vast area and unaware of each other’s position or composition. . . . Our own covering forces are always handicapped by having to identify a contact before they are free to attack. . . The splitting of a convoy into a large number of scattered units would greatly add to this handicap.”

It was reasoned that smaller convoys would be less difficult to manage and thus stand a better chance of survival. The Admiralty concurred, and what would have been PQ19 of some thirty merchantmen was instead divided into two convoys, namely JW51A and JW51B.

JW51A sailed with 16 merchantmen from Liverpool on 16 December 1942 and, with good luck and favourable weather, arrived at Murmansk on 25 December without loss. The return convoy would be designated RA51.

JW51B of 15 merchantmen assembled in Loch Ewe (NW Scotland) prior to its sailing on 22 December.


The Convoy (JW51B)
The convoy consisted of fifteen merchantmen; five British, nine American and one Panamanian. They carried 2,046 vehicles, 202 tanks, 87 crated fighter planes, 33 crated bombers, 11,600 tons of fuel oil, 12,650 tons of aviation spirit, and 54,000 tons of other equipment and supplies.

The merchantmen were:
Empire Archer (Br), Daldorch (Br), Empire Emerald (Br), Pontfield (Br), Dover Hill (Br), Chester Valley (US), Puerto Rican (US), Executive (US), R.W. Emerson (US), Ballot (US), Jefferson Myers (US), Vermont (US), Yorkmar (US), J.H. Latrobe (US), Calobre (Pan).

The convoy commodore was Captain Melhuish, sailing in Empire Archer, and the captain of the Calobre was the vice-commodore.


Convoy protection
The convoy was to be escorted all the way from Loch Ewe to Murmansk by the minesweeper Bramble; the corvettes Hyderabad and Rhododendron; and by the trawlers Northern Gem and Vizalma, both of which were equipped as rescue ships.

For the first part of the voyage from Loch Ewe, they would be accompanied by three Hunt class destroyers Blankney, Chiddingfold, Ledbury and the minesweeper Circe which, when they had reached the limit of their endurance, would leave the convoy and make for Seidisfiord, Iceland to refuel, before returning to the U.K.

Before the Hunts were due to leave the convoy, the escort would be strengthened by the seven destroyers of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla under Captain Sherbrooke in Onslow, with Oribi, Obedient, Obdurate, Orwell, Achates and Bulldog. These would sail from Seidisfiord to rendezvous with the convoy at a point NE of Iceland and escort it the rest of the way to Murmansk.

Providing distant cover would be Force R, under Rear-Admiral Burnett, consisting of the two light cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica, both armed with 12x6” and 8x4” guns. Force R had escorted JW51A all the way to Murmansk, but would sail to rendezvous with JW51B at a point SW of Bear Island and escort it through the Barents Sea until they too had reached Murmansk. Burnett would position his ships 50 miles behind and ten miles to the north of the convoy, which would give them the advantage of seeing enemy ships approaching from the south, silhouetted against the limited amount of daylight, while obscuring themselves.

Sailing from Akureyri in Iceland, Vice-Admiral Fraser in the battleship Anson with the cruiser Cumberland and three destroyers, would provide remote cover to the south of the convoy as far as Bear Island. This had the dual role of preventing attack by heavy German units approaching from the south, and interdicting their passage to the North Atlantic, should that be their intention.

Although not part of the escort, a line of submarines patrolling the North Cape were to report movements of German forces from Norwegian ports and attack if possible. They were Torbay, P47, P216, P223, P312, P339, Sokol (Polish), O14 (Dutch).


German forces
Because Hitler was convinced the British intended to invade Norway, a large number of the Kriegsmarine’s heavy units were permanently stationed there. In the northern ports of Norway, there was the battleship Tirpitz at Trondheim (refitting but available at short notice); the panzerschiffe (pocket battleship) Lutzow, the heavy cruiser Hipper and light cruiser Koln at Altenfiord; and the light cruiser Nurnberg at Narvik, all with destroyers in attendance.

Vice-Admiral Kummetz was given the task of devising a plan to attack JW51B (or PQ20 as they called it, unaware of the change of designation). Operation Regenbogen (Rainbow) was the result and the Lutzow (6x11” and 8x5.9” guns) and Hipper (8x8” and 12x4.1” guns) were assigned to it. They were to operate as cooperating separate forces.

Heavy cruiser - Admiral Hipper (Vizeadmiral Kummetz) with
Destroyers - Richard Beitzen (Z4), Friedrich Eckholdt (Z16), Z29.

Panzerschiffe - Lutzow (Kapitan zur See Stange) with
Destroyers - Theodor Riedel (Z6), Z30, Z31.

[Note 1: Lutzow was the renamed Deutschland, a sister ship to the Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer. Although always called a pocket battleship by the British, the Germans reclassified her as a heavy cruiser.]

[Note 2: The destroyers Z29, Z30 and Z31 each had 5x5.9” guns, the others had 5x5” guns, and each was larger that the 'O' class British destroyers.]


The escort defensive tactics

At this time of year, daylight in the latitudes the convoy would be sailing lasted only for about one hour when the sun rose to a few degrees above the horizon. For about two hours either side of this was merely twilight. Due to this poor visibility and the usual bad weather, it was not expected that aerial reconnaissance and attacks by aircraft would be likely. For the same reasons, U-Boats would have difficulty in locating the convoy as sighting reports from aircraft would be lacking. Also, it was known that a number of aircraft from Norway had been relocated to the Mediterranean area in response to the Torch landings.

The main threat would come from surface vessels, of which there were many stationed in northern Norway. Captain Sherbrooke had devised a plan to counteract such an attack on the convoy by a superior German surface force, which can be summarised as follows:

When a surface raider is first seen:-
1) The five ‘O’ class destroyers (5x4.7” guns) would leave the convoy and head towards the enemy.
2) The convoy would turn away from the enemy, with the rear ships dropping smoke floats.
3) Achates and Bulldog would steam a zigzag path across the rear of the convoy making smoke.
4) The remaining five escorts would stay with the convoy and reform the escort screen.
5) The convoy would continue to alter course so as to keep the enemy astern.

The five 'O' class destroyers would feign torpedo attacks on the enemy to force it to turn away before it could come within range of the convoy.

The only weapon a destroyer had to deter a larger enemy warship was its torpedoes. These were usually fired in a single salvo, but once they had been launched they couldn’t be reloaded. Essentially it was a one shot weapon and, having used them, the destroyer would no longer present a credible threat. Thus it was essential to preserve the torpedoes as long as possible.

From the enemy’s viewpoint, it was not possible to deduce whether a destroyer approaching for an apparent torpedo attack actually intended to launch its torpedoes. In the twilight conditions that existed, it would be difficult to see if they had actually been launched. While a single attacking vessel could probably be dealt with before it came within range, an attack by several destroyers probably couldn’t. The only safe option was to make a defensive turn away to comb the expected torpedo tracks.

This is what Sherbrooke expected and relied upon for his plan to work. Feigned attacks were necessary to preserve the torpedo threat for as long as possible, as the enemy was sure to make repeated attempts to get at the convoy.


The German plan of attack
German heavy units operated at sea under restrictions imposed upon them by Hitler. They were not allowed to engage an equal or superior force, nor were night time actions in which enemy destroyers were present permitted for fear of torpedo attack. Consequently, Kummetz had to time his attack to coincide with the only two and a half hours of dim light available at those high latitudes.

Operation Rainbow would begin only when JW51B had been sighted, its position and course established, and when permission was received. Only then would Vice-Admiral Kummetz in the Hipper with her three destroyers, sail from Altenfiord, followed by Lutzow with her three destroyers.

Kummetz, intended to sweep along the convoy’s track from west to east in the morning so that it would be silhouetted against what little morning light there was coming from the east. On sighting the convoy, Hipper would attack its north flank, drawing off the escorts northwards. Kummetz reasoned that the convoy would then turn away to the south, from which direction Lutzow would be approaching. Lutzow would then have a free hand to get among the merchantmen unhindered by the escorts.

It was a classic pincer attack, which if accomplished, would nullify Sherbrooke’s tactics which defended the convoy against an attack from one direction only. But there would be operational difficulties in coordinating the attack as the two forces, would be operating out of sight of each other and maintaining radio silence. And then there was the weather.


Prelude
JW51B sailed from Loch Ewe in the afternoon of Tuesday 22 December. The merchantmen started in single file, then gradually formed up into a four deep by four wide convoy sailing NNW at about 8 knots with their escort. Sherbrooke in Onslow followed soon afterwards as fast as conditions allowed, bound for Seidisfiord where the other destroyers of the 17th Flotilla had proceeded independently. There they would refuel before rejoining the convoy.

The destoyers Bulldog and Achates, having departed independently from Gourock the previous day, were being battered by a force 9 southerly gale which soon became a force 12 storm, forcing them to heave to. Bulldog was so damaged that she was forced to return for repairs, while Achates, although damaged, made it to Seidisfiord where she was repaired in time.

Next day, the convoy was also battered by the same bad weather and lost formation. The Dover Hill had to turn back damaged and with boiler trouble.

At 23.00 on 24 December, the 17th Destroyer Flotilla, now with only six ships, sailed from Seidisfiord to rendezvous with the convoy currently 150 miles to the east, which was sighted the next day at about 14.30. They took up their positions and the Hunts were sent to round up the stragglers, after which the convoy changed course to the NE. In the evening, the three Hunt class destroyers and the minesweeper Circe left the convoy to return - their part of the job was over.

On the 26th, Vice-Admiral Fraser in the battleship Anson, with Cumberland and three destroyers sailed from Akureyri, Iceland to take up a remote patrol line south of the convoy's route.

On the 27th, Rear-Admiral Burnett with Force R sailed from Murmansk.

-----“-----
(to be continued)
Last edited by emason on Mon Jul 19, 2021 7:43 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Bill
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

Unread post by emason »

The Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)


(Part 2)

The convoy
JW51B sailing NE and making steady progress, crossed the Arctic Circle on the morning of the 26th and at noon was at 68.23N, 6.32W, some 300 miles NE of Seidisfiord and 200 miles SSE of Jan Mayen Island. A Coastal Command Liberator found and circled the convoy, whose position, course and speed were signalled to it for onward transmission to the Admiralty. By noon the next day (27th) they had reached 70.48N, 00.22W, 200 miles ESE Jan Mayen Island

During the night of the 27th, the NW wind increased to force 7, forcing the convoy to slow to 7 knots. The spray whipped up by the wind started to ice up every ship. At noon on the 28th their position was 72.35N, 4.20E, midway between Jan Mayen Island and Bear Island. The wind increased and changed to NNW, causing the ships to roll heavily. A few had problems with shifting deck cargo and Jefferson Myers was forced to heave to. The escort Oribi disappeared but was briefly seen through snow squalls.

On the 29th, the deck cargo of Daldorch broke loose and was swept away. Visibility varied between a few hundred yards and 1.5 miles. Oribi was still missing; having had a gyro compass failure she had lost contact with the convoy during the night, and by morning as there was still no sign of it, made her way to Murmansk independently by dead reckoning.

At noon the convoy had reached 73.19N, 11.45E, 180 miles WSW of Bear Island, and by afternoon, the wind had eased and visibility increased to 10 miles, when only 9 ships of the convoy in ragged order could be seen. The trawler Vizalma and Oribi were missing, so at 12.30 Bramble, which had the best radar, was sent to search for them and the stragglers.

Work was started to remove the heavy ice which had accumulated over every ship during the past two days. The speed of the convoy was reduced to 6 knots to allow stragglers to catch up. At midnight the course was changed to due east.

On the morning of the 30th, the Vizalma and Chester Valley were well to the north, out of sight of the convoy, which itself had been blown by the gale some 15 miles south of its scheduled course. Bramble had not returned, and Obdurate was sent to round up the straggling merchantmen.

During the morning, JW51B had been sighted and shadowed by U354 (KptLt Karl-Heinz Herbschleb) which reported its position, course, speed and escort strength at noon, when their position was 73.27N, 19.35E, 100 miles south of Bear Island. That afternoon, U354 manoeuvred into position and at 16.00, fired a spread salvo of three torpedoes which all missed as the convoy zigged, or maybe it zagged.

After dark, she surfaced and followed the convoy from its starboard quarter. At 20.20, Obdurate and Obedient were sent to investigate a possible surfaced U-Boat contact. Obdurate caught a glimpse of U354 and altered course to ram, but the U-boat dived in time, and the two destroyers began an ASDIC search of the area. But strata of warm and cold water effectively masked the U-Boat. Once a faint echo was heard and several depth charges were dropped, but contact with U354 was lost.

This same day, Convoy RA51 departed Murmansk bound for Loch Ewe.

At 08.00 on the 31st, the convoy had twelve merchantmen in formation with two still missing.


Force R
On the 27th December, Force R consisting of the light cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica, with destroyers Matchless and Opportune, put to sea from Murmansk. The weather was so overcast that stars were not sighted for the next four days and navigation was by dead reckoning. It sailed south of JW51B’s route to cover any attack developing from Norwegian ports. Force R sailed as far west as 11 degrees east on the 29th, overlapping the eastern patrol limit of Fraser's Anson group. The destroyers Matchless and Opportune were detached to continue to Iceland, and the two cruisers turned round to the east.

The last Burnett had heard of the convoy’s position from the Admiralty had been an estimate that it would pass Bear Island (19 degrees east) at 16.00 on the 29th, but it didn’t reach this position until 12.00 on the 30th. (This estimate was based on the position signalled to the Liberator on the 26th.) JW51B had been delayed by the storm and was now about 60 miles behind and some way south of its intended position.

Burnett had intended to position himself some 50 miles behind the convoy and ten miles to the north of its track. So at 18.00 on the 30th, Force R turned to the NW to come around astern of the convoy to take station 50 miles behind it and 10 miles to the north by dawn. But because the convoy was behind schedule, Force R actually passed in front of it, and at 08.00 on the 31st found itself some 30 miles north of the convoy, still heading NW looking for it.


Hipper and Lutzow group
Following U354's report at noon on the 30th, the Kriegsmarine now had a more accurate fix of JW51B's position than did the Admiralty. On receipt of the report, approval for Operation Rainbow was given and Kummetz received his orders:

1. Hipper, Lutzow and six destroyers to operate against convoy PQ20 (sic). Operational command will be exercised by Admiral Kluber. [CinC Group North, Narvik]
2. Cover name ‘Rainbow’. Sail as soon as possible. Report time.
3. Speed of PQ20 between seven and twelve knots. Position of PQ20 at midnight 31st the area between 75.30N and 71.30N, 36 and 43 east.
4. It is desirable to bring in single ships. There is to be no time wasted in rescuing enemy crews. It would be of value only to take a few captains and others prisoner with a view to interrogation. The rescue of enemy survivors by enemy forces is not desirable.
5. The operation is limited south of 70 degrees north.
6. Contact with the Luftwaffe should be maintained by Admiral Kluber.


In Admiral Kluber’s additional orders to Kummetz, he emphasised the danger from torpedoes to Hipper and Lutzow because their tracks would be difficult to see in the half light. He also reminded him of the standard procedure on meeting an enemy: “. . . avoid a superior force, otherwise destroy according to tactical situation”.

Kummetz put to sea at 18.00 on 30 December and set a NE course. Almost immediately afterwards, at 18.40 he received another signal from Admiral Kluber which stated “Contrary to the operational order regarding contact against the enemy, you are to use caution even against enemy of equal strength because it is undesirable for the cruisers to take any great risks.”

After leaving Altenfiord together, Hipper and Lutzow sailed north eastwards. During the night Lutzow detached with her destroyers intending to arrive in a position 75 miles south of Hipper at 08.00 on the 31st.

At 05.30 on the 31st, after the two groups had separated, Lutzow’s Captain Stange, on his first operational voyage, received further orders from Admiral Kluber:
1. After completion ‘Rainbow’ intending to release Lutzow within the North Sea northwards of 70 degrees north between 5 degrees east and 35 degrees east.
2. Mission: cruiser war, detect enemy shipping traffic, attack single cruisers and poorly secured escorts. Cue for release – ‘Aurora’ . . .
3. Development of ‘Rainbow’ is crucial for release. . . Proceed only if Lutzow has at least half of artillery and torpedo ammunition left.
4. Break off Lutzow’s being at sea independently as soon as enemy units can be recognised from heavy cruiser upwards or after collection of enemy forces becomes probable following considerable success. . . Further information later.


This was news to Stange who said of this signal: “The receipt of this signal creates a new situation for me in so far as contrary to original plans . . . it is now no longer possible to talk the operation through with B.d.K. (Kummetz) in detail, neither can I request documents about the enemy from him . . .

The cumulative effect of these signals on the two commanders can only be imagined.

At 08.00 on the 31st, both Hipper and Lutzow, 75 miles to the south, were to turn eastwards and sweep along the convoy’s expected track. At 07.15, dim shadows were seen bearing 060 from Hipper, and Friedrich Eckholdt was sent to investigate. At 07.45 more shadows were sighted - Kummetz had found the convoy, albeit much further to the west than anticipated, and by 08.00 he was in position to start his attack.

-----“-----
(to be continued)
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

Unread post by emason »

The Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)


(Part 3)
New Year’s Eve 1942

Resume of 08.00 position
At 08.00 on the 31st December, JW51B was 150 miles ESE of Bear Island and 220 miles NW of its destination Murmansk. To the east, 150 miles away, the home-bound convoy RA51 was heading west.

A gentle force 2-3 wind was blowing from the NW over the convoy’s port quarter. Visibility in the dim light all round was about 8 miles, except when occasional snow squalls reduced it to a few hundred yards. The sea was smooth with a long swell; the barometer read 1004 millibars and rising; the sea temperature was 41F and the air temperature 15F. It was a fine day for the time of year in these latitudes.

Force R was 30 miles to the north steaming NW away from the convoy thinking it was coming up behind it. Bramble hadn’t been seen since it was detached to look for the two escorts Oribi and Vizalma on the 29th. Oribi, having suffered a gyro compass failure causing it to loose contact with the convoy, was on its way to Murmansk. The trawler Vizalma was about 45 miles to the NW escorting the straggler Chester Valley, unaware of the convoy’s position.

This meant that Sherbrooke was short of three escort ships, Bramble, Oribi and Vizalma (four if Bulldog is counted) at a time they would be needed the most.

The Hipper, heading ESE, was about 25 miles NW of the main body of the convoy. Her three destroyers, having located the convoy, were 10 miles south of the convoy heading north to rejoin her. Meanwhile, Lutzow with her three destroyers were about 50 miles south of the convoy heading NNE to close the trap.


The first sighting
At about 08.20, Hyderabad, to the rear of the convoy’s starboard wing, spotted two ships to the south heading north so as to cross the convoy’s wake. Due to a badly decoded message notifying the convoy to expect two Russian aircraft, two Russian ships were expected instead. Hyderabad assumed these unidentified ships to be Russian and didn’t report their presence.

Obdurate, on the convoy’s starboard beam, saw the same two ships and reported to Sherbrooke in Onslow “Two destroyers bearing 210”. Because Onslow was on the opposite side of the convoy, ahead on the port wing, the signal lamp message was relayed through Obedient. Thinking these ships could be the missing Oribi and Bramble rejoining the convoy, or the Russians, and being unable to identify them, Sherbrooke ordered Obdurate to investigate. The reply was similarly routed back and this all took time. So it was not until some 25 minutes later that Obdurate received the reply “Your 08.30 investigate”.

Obdurate immediately turned around to cross astern of the convoy, came to Action Stations and made to close the mystery ships. The two unidentified destroyers became three sailing in line ahead, and at 09.15, when they were 8,000 yards away, turned to the NE. Obdurate challenged them by signal to which there was no reply (nothing unusual had they been Russian), but shortly afterwards one of them opened fire, the shells falling short of Obdurate which turned away.

The gunfire was both seen and heard by Sherbrooke in Onslow, who immediately sounded Action Stations and turned about to investigate, signalling to the other destroyers "Join me. Course 270". Achates and other smaller escorts started to make smoke to cover the convoy which made an emergency 45 degree turn to starboard and the SE.

Onslow, with Orwell in company and Obedient hurrying to catch up, sped towards the anticipated action. At about 09.40, they saw a ship much larger that a destroyer, emerging from the gloom, bows on about eight miles away, its identity unknown until it turned to port when it was soon recognised as the Admiral Hipper. An enemy contact report was immediately sent off to Admiral Tovey at Scapa Flow.

At 09.41, Hipper opened fire on Achates, which stood out from the smoke she was laying. Hipper’s third and fourth salvoes at Achates were very close, showering her with splinters causing serious damage and many casualties. Her speed dropped, but she continued with her smoke laying task apparently unhindered. Hipper then switched her fire to the rearmost merchantman in convoy, the tanker Empire Emerald, loaded with some 7,400 tons of aviation spirit and 2,500 tons of fuel oil.

The two leading British destroyers, Onslow and Orwell, opened fire from 9,000 yards range, on the Hipper. But the only gun Onslow could fire was the 'B' turret, as the 'Y' turret wouldn't yet bear, and the breeches of 'A' and 'X' turrets couldn't be closed due to a build up of ice behind the extractors.

Hipper, now seeing the fast approaching destroyers, ceased firing at the tanker and turned away to the NE to avoid the expected torpedo attack. The destroyers changed course similarly to keep themselves between the attacker and convoy, and continued firing at Hipper until she was hidden from view by a snow shower.

At 09.55, a signal was received from Burnett in Sheffield, “Am approaching on course 170” which was good news, even if it didn’t say how far away he was.


Force R
At 08.00 Rear-Admiral Burnett with Force R had been 30 miles north of JW51B heading NW at 17 knots, soon expecting to turn eastwards to come 50 miles behind it. At 09.00 a radar contact, 8 miles dead ahead, was obtained, which a few minutes later could be dimly seen to be a ship travelling eastwards at 25 knots, which was later corrected to two ships steering ESE at 10 knots. (They were the Vizalma and Chester Valley.)

Burnett changed course to the NE to close and establish their identity, then SE shortly after. At about 09.30, gun flashes were seen in the distance to the south, but were assumed to come from anti-aircraft fire. (It was actually the German destroyers firing on Obdurate.)

Burnett was not satisfied with the identity of these mystery ships, so he turned NE to get closer and continued to track them for another 15 minutes, until heavy gunfire was seen in the south and Sherbrooke’s enemy report was received. Whereupon Burnett signalled Sherbrooke at 09.50 that he was on his way, and turned Force R to the SSE towards the gunfire and increased speed to 31 knots.
Map-B.jpg

Thrust and parry

Kummetz’s plan was to draw the escorts away to the north, while driving the convoy towards the Lutzow in the south. He meant to keep the escort destroyers at the limit of their weapons and to keep them occupied by making feints towards the convoy, while hoping to pick them off with his longer range guns. As the destroyer tactics were to make feints towards the Hipper to drive her away, it developed into a battle of feint and counter-feint. This suited both Commanders as they were both achieving their purpose; but it suited Kummetz more, as he was keeping the British destroyers to the north of the convoy.

After turning to the NE to avoid the torpedo attack he feared, Kummetz at 09.57 turned the Hipper eastwards to resume his attack. Now on a parallel course to Onslow and Orwell, Hipper opened fire with all four turrets of its main armament to which the two destroyers replied with all their guns. Hipper turned away three minutes later to draw the destroyers away from the convoy.

The three German destroyers had been lost sight of during the skirmishing, and Sherbrooke thought they might be positioning themselves to attack the merchantmen. So at 10.05 Obedient and Obdurate were ordered to rejoin the convoy to cover against this. But the German destroyers were only intent on rejoining Hipper. Sherbrooke now had only Onslow and Orwell to deter the Hipper. This was when he felt the absence of his four missing escorts the most.

A few minutes later, Kummetz turned towards the convoy for a third time. Hipper turned SE onto a converging course, firing at the destroyers with all its 8” guns. The destroyers weaved to avoid the shells, but stubbornly stuck to their eastwards course defending the convoy. After four minutes of this, Hipper once again turned away to the NE, and again the destroyers didn’t follow.

Commenting on these skirmishes, Kummetz stated in his report:
“The destroyers are . . . remarkably versatile. They push in between the convoy and Hipper in a way that it is not possible to get at the steamers. They are using a very effective artificial fog, trying to cover up the steamers. By evasive manoeuvres and seeking shelter in the fog and smoke area they are cleverly trying to escape the artillery fire from Hipper. Their position to each other shows Hipper in danger from torpedoes, even when she moves towards them directly for a higher artillery effect and to use the artillery against the steamers.”

At 10.13 Kummetz signalled, “Hipper to north of convoy and there are four enemy destroyers between us and the convoy”. By this time his three destroyers had joined him, following astern. His plan was working perfectly.


An unequal contest
At 10.13 Kummetz made a more determined fourth attack, by turning Hipper to the SE again and this time using all its main and secondary armament.

At the time, Onslow was leading Orwell on an ENE course when they saw Hipper turn to close them. Hipper’s first two salvoes were well over, and the destroyers returned fire, but Onslow’s ‘A’ and ‘X’ turrets were still iced up. Gradually, Hipper got Onslow’s range and straddled her with the 7th and 8th salvoes, causing splinter damage.

At 10.18 Onslow was again straddled, and one shell hit the top of the funnel, knocking out the radar and main radio aerials. The bridge was sprayed with splinters, one of which struck Sherbrooke in his face, badly wounding him. The next salvo directly struck below ‘B’ turret and the forecastle abreast ‘A’ turret, putting both turrets out of action and starting a fire.

Sherbrooke, still commanding from the bridge, ordered a turn to starboard and to make smoke. The next three incoming salvoes mercifully missed, landing only about 100 feet away. After that, with Onslow on fire, she ceased to be the object of Hipper’s attention, switching her fire to Orwell, which turned to follow Onslow and made smoke to screen them both.

Kummetz, having finally achieved the success he desired, and with his access to the convoy now practically unopposed, he turned Hipper away again to the ENE, and away from JW51B, probably fearing a torpedo attack from out of the smoke screen.

Having ensured the fires were being tackled and Onslow was out of immediate danger, Sherbrooke transferred command of the 17th Flotilla to Commander Kinloch in Obedient. Only when he received an acknowledgement from Kinloch, did he finally consent to go below for treatment for his injury.
Map-A.jpg

(to be continued)
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

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The Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)

(Part 4)

The position at 10.30
When Commander Kinloch in Obedient took over command of the 17th Flotilla from Sherbrooke, the situation was far from clear to him. From a position obscured by smoke and snow squalls, he had but a blurred picture of the overall situation. In fact JW51B was still heading SE, having turned at 09.45 to keep the action with Hipper astern of it.

Obedient and Obdurate, having been ordered to cover the convoy against the German destroyers, were heading SE, three miles north of it, between it and the Hipper. Orwell, with the damaged and burning Onslow, were another three miles north of them, heading south towards the convoy. The damaged Achates was dutifully sticking to its task at the rear of the convoy weaving across its wake and making smoke. The other escorts kept their station and also made smoke.

The minesweeper Bramble was about 15 miles NE of the convoy, course unknown. Force R was now heading SSE, about 25 miles north of the convoy, 15 miles NW of Hipper, and approaching fast.

Hipper, with her destroyers following, was twelve miles north of the convoy heading ENE, away from it but towards Bramble only 8 miles away. The Lutzow and its three destroyers were now only about eight miles south of the convoy making 26 knots heading NNE directly towards it.

In summary, all the German ships were making to the north, while the convoy and escorts were moving southwards.


The Hipper group
Hipper, having broken off the action with Onslow and Orwell, had turned ENE and few minutes later at 10.36 saw a ship on the port bow which she took to be a destroyer or corvette, but was in fact the minesweeper Bramble. Hipper opened fire on her and Bramble sent an enemy report “One cruiser bearing 300”. Only one ship picked up the report, the Hyderabad who failed to pass on the report as she assumed that other ships had also received it.

Hipper fired at Bramble for six minutes then signalled the destroyer Friedrich Eckholdt to finish her off, and Bramble went down with all hands. After this, Hipper turned north to avoid Bramble, then made a long starboard turn around her and headed southwards to regain contact with the convoy, and by 10.55 was heading SSW, 20 miles from the convoy to the SW.

[Note: Bramble had not been seen since 12.30 on the 29th when she was detached to search for stragglers. It remains a mystery why she hadn’t returned for nearly two days. To account for her position at 10.30, it can only be assumed that she was well to the NE of the convoy when she became aware of the gunfire and/or received Sherbrooke’s enemy contact report, and turned SW to return, but had the misfortune to run into the Hipper when she did. Her fate was not learned by the British until after the war.]


The escort movements
The damaged Onslow, no longer capable of effective action (no radar, ASDIC or forward guns), was despatched to take position ahead of the convoy, and Orwell joined with Obedient and Obdurate, now heading southwards to take up position on the threatened port side of the convoy.

Rhododendron reported smoke to the southwest, followed ten minutes later by a report of a large vessel bearing 160, two miles away steering NNE. This was also seen from Onslow, where it was identified as the Lutzow. But Lutzow either did not see her, or chose to ignore her.

Obedient, Obdurate and Orwell, proceeding southwards at 11.00, also saw Lutzow now steering SE, so increased speed down to the east side of the convoy to keep themselves between it and Lutzow.

Achates, still dutifully making smoke to the rear of the convoy, was ordered to join Onslow at its head. But when at 11.15, Achates moved out to follow the other destroyers down the port side of the convoy, she suddenly came under fire from Hipper which had arrived back on the scene from the NE. Achates was immediately straddled and soon after received a direct hit on the bridge killing everyone there.

Lieutenant Peyton-Jones assumed command amid shells exploding on either side of the ship, peppering it with splinters. He couldn't see from where the attack was coming, as smoke from a cordite fire on ‘B’ gundeck obscured his view until it was extinguished by a heavy sea breaking over the forecastle. A second direct hit was followed by two more near misses which peppered her sides.

The convoy turned to the south at 11.25 to keep this action astern, and at the same time Hipper turned to the NW and switched her fire to Obedient, which gave Peyton-Jones time to asses his position. The smoke cleared, and having now established that the enemy was to the north, he disregarded the earlier order to join Onslow and decided that Achates was more help where she was, making smoke to cover the convoy from Hipper.

After a few salvoes at Obedient, causing minor damage, Kummetz broke off and Hipper continued to the NW.


The Lutzow group
Two of Lutzow’s destroyers, having earlier been despatched on an unsuccessful attempt to locate the convoy, returned to her at 10.35. A few minutes later, a snow squall blotted out much to the north, but a ship had been briefly seen before it disappeared into the squall. Lutzow's presence had been detected by the corvette Rhododendron which reported smoke bearing 197 seven miles. Ten minutes later she reported again an unknown warship bearing 165 two miles away. But both reports were discounted by Kinloch as he reasoned that an enemy ship sailing this close to the convoy would have already opened fire.

Lutzow’s radar detected several contacts within the squall which Captain Stange thought were probably the convoy, but he could not be sure, and his orders were to be cautious. So he reduced speed and turned slightly to starboard onto a NE course, until the squall had passed. He then intended to turn around and run alongside the convoy to obtain a positive identification.

In doing this Stange had missed a golden opportunity, for Kummetz's plan had worked to perfection. Lutzow had crossed the convoy's course only two miles ahead of it, with all the escort destroyers to the north of it keeping Hipper at bay. With all the firepower he had at his disposal in his four ships, Stange, with a little more determination, could and should have totally destroyed the convoy in a few minutes. Apart from Lutzow's 6x11" guns, they had between them, 18x5.9" guns and 32x21" torpedo tubes.

[Note: Stange's reluctance to attack is difficult to understand as he had already been informed at 10.13 by Kummetz, “Hipper to north of convoy and there are four enemy destroyers between us and the convoy”. Therefore, the multiple radar contacts seen from the Lutzow from the south could only have been the convoy. Surely this was carrying caution too far!]

At 10.55, the Lutzow group turned to the SE on a parallel course with the convoy, now only five miles away to the SE. At 11.26, gun flashes from Hipper's engagement with Achates were seen in the distance astern and, as he still couldn't identify a clear target, Stange turned Lutzow starboard about to the NW, intending to link up with the Hipper.

As she progressed to the NW, her course took her to the north of the convoy, which had turned to the south at 11.25 to avoid Hipper. Lutzow was watched all the way by the only three undamaged destroyers, Obdurate, Obedient and Orwell who interposed themselves between this formidable enemy and the convoy and made smoke. Each of the three German destroyers alone outgunned each of the three ‘O’ class British destroyers.

Despite the snow and smoke, Lutzow finally got a brief clear view of the convoy at 11.42, and opened fire, straddling the merchantman Colobre, damaging her from a near miss with shell splinters. The convoy made an emergency turn to the SW, and the escort destroyers opened fire on Lutzow, but the shots from their 4” guns fell short. In reply, the destroyer Z30 also opened fire and fired four torpedoes which all missed, and at 11.45 after one more salvo, Lutzow ceased fire and turned to join with Hipper.

Soon after this, Hipper was seen with two destroyers on a SW course, four miles to the north of Obedient. Commander Kinloch ordered his destroyers to turn NW to cover this renewed threat, and Hipper also turned to the NW. By this time Lutzow, still closing on the Hipper, opened fire with her secondary armament on the British destroyers to which they replied. At 12.00 she fired her main armament, immediately damaging Obdurate with a near miss.

The Lutzow group continued to the NW, following a few miles to the SE behind the Hipper group on the same course, while the watchful British destroyers fell back on the convoy.


Force R
We left Force R at 10.30 making 31 knots heading SSE, about 25 miles north of the convoy. From Sheffield, gunflashes were seen to the south which appeared to be from two separate actions. At 11.05, a radar contact was obtained of two vessels to the south, both larger than destroyers and travelling faster than merchantmen which identified themselves as being the enemy. (One would have been Hipper and the other a destroyer.)

At 11.10, course was changed to SSW to close with the larger of the two targets, which at 11.20 was seen to be firing at a target to the south (this was Hipper firing on Achates). When Hipper turned NW to switch her fire to Obedient, she presented her broadside to Force R and was immediately identified. Kummetz was completely unaware of the presence of these two British cruisers less than eight miles away to the NNE.

At 11.30, Sheffield opened fire with all her main armament, followed moments later by Jamaica. Hipper was caught with her guns still trained port side on Obedient to the south, and it was not until Sheffield and Jamaica had fired four salvoes each that they could be brought to bear on the cruisers. Although Hipper managed to fire several salvoes in return, her fire was inaccurate as the spray kicked up from near misses, had frozen on the her gunnery optics.

By this time, Hipper was turning quickly to starboard and heeling to port. Sheffield’s fifth salvo found the mark, hitting Hipper below the armoured belt, penetrating a fuel tank and exploding in no.3 boiler room, putting it out of action and reducing her speed to 23 knots. She received two more hits; one started a fire in her aircraft hangar, and the other hit amidships above the armoured belt, penetrating almost the entire width of the ship, stopping at the inner wall of the hull on the port side without exploding, but causing several casualties.

At this crucial time, Kummetz received a three word reminder from Admiral Kluber: “No unnecessary risk”. So it is no surprise that Kummetz wrote:
Hipper’s ability for battle is reduced. Time will tell the full impact of the blows. The enemy’s type of ship, which has just appeared on the scene and bombarded Hipper from the north, has not yet been identified beyond doubt. According to the kind of shooting, the closeness of the impacts and their effect, it can only be a cruiser. If this is the case I am positioned between an enemy cruiser and the convoy destroyers in the south. . . . I therefore decide to pull all armed forces to the west away from the battle area.”

So Hipper disengaged by continuing turning to starboard and executed a 270 degree turn before heading away to the SW. Force R conformed to Hipper’s movements to keep in contact, but at 11.40, before the full turn was completed, a destroyer was seen fast approaching from the NE only 4,000 yards away, as though on a torpedo attack. It was quickly identified as German and immediately engaged by Sheffield with all guns that would bear.

The destroyer was the Friedrich Eckholdt, with Richard Beitzen following, returning from having sunk Bramble, and had mistaken Sheffield for Hipper in the poor visibility. She was hit by the first salvo and heavily damaged by the third, and by the time fire was checked after the sixteenth salvo, was on fire, down by the stern and a complete wreck. She went down with all hands.

The Richard Beitzen was luckier; when she came into view she was engaged by Jamaica, but realised in time her mistake and had turned away at speed and escaped undamaged.

Meanwhile, Hipper had turned to the NW at 11.50, so five minutes later, Sheffield and Jamaica did a wide loop to port, which brought them within ten miles NE of Hipper on a similar NW course.

While all this action was taking place, U-354 was still on the scene observing the action, and at 11.45 had sent a signal to Admiral Kluber in Narvik: “Observing from this position the battle has reached its climax. I can see only red” – a message that was interpreted by Admiral Kluber in Narvik as signifying success.
Map-C.jpg


(to be continued)
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

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The Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)

(Part 5)

Force R
Meanwhile to the north, Force R, now sailing westward, had regained radar contact with Hipper to the SW, when at 12.15, two German destroyers sailing on Hipper‘s starboard quarter were seen, only about 8,000 yards away and in a good position to launch a torpedo attack. Burnett altered course towards them to engage, but almost immediately Lutzow was seen beyond them at a range of 17,000 yards.

Notwithstanding the destroyer’s presence, at 12.30 Force R closed on Lutzow to 14,000 yards and opened fire. Lutzow immediately replied with her main armament. Lutzow's log states, "The enemy opened fire as orders were given to our own guns. First salvo straddled. Subsequent salvoes very accurate". Lutzow's own fire was inaccurate, falling a mile short of Sheffield, but a few minutes later very accurate fire straddled Sheffield - it was the Hipper joining in, her optics having been cleared,

The British cruisers were now in a precarious situation, being under fire from both Lutzow to the south and Hipper to the SW, and with the ever present threat of torpedo attack from the destroyers. Calculating the chances that his two light cruisers had against a pocket battleship, a heavy cruiser and five large destroyers, Burnett decided against biting off more than he could chew and prudently disengaged, ordering a starboard turn to the north, and by 12.36 all firing had ceased,

At 12.53, Kummetz received a signal from Admiral Kluber, “Return at high speed. Two enemy cruisers confirmed in Murmansk area. One of them Jamaica.” Kummetz must have despaired at Kluber’s overbearing caution. Nevertheless, the German ships obediently turned to the SW, and by 13.00 were heading back to Altenfiord.

Shortly after disengaging and turning north, Force R gradually turned to port, so that by 13.00 was heading SW to keep the German ships within radar range. They maintained contact with the German ships until about 13.45, when radar contact was lost. Force R then swept north and south to ensure they were not doubling back on the convoy, and to ensure no other German ships were attempting to attack, as it was known that the light cruiser Koln had also been based at Altenfiord.

Satisfied that German forces no longer presented a threat, Force R continued to cover the convoy until 03.00 the next day (1st January), when it left JW51B and headed NW to cover the homeward bound convoy RA51.
Map-D.jpg

HMS Achates
When at 11.15, Achates had been attacked for the second time by Hipper, she had been severely damaged and left in a semi sinking state, but she had stuck to her task of protecting the convoy in the only way she was able - with smoke.

But she was in a bad way. She had taken a direct hit below the bridge on the starboard side. A huge hole had been made in the hull alongside no.2 boiler room which had to be abandoned. Light and power had mostly failed and the casualties were severe. By 11.45 she was down by the bow and had taken on a 15 degree list to port.

Although her speed had been reduced to 12 knots, she was still able to steer a zigzag course to the rear of the convoy and make smoke. But the list was slowly increasing as more splinter holes became submerged. Finally at 13.00, it was no longer possible to maintain steam and the ship slowly came to a halt.

In requesting the nearest escort ship, the trawler Northern Gem, to stand by her, Lieutenant Peyton-Jones had hoped to have her taken in tow. But as the trawler approached, Achates rolled onto her port side, and slowly sank. Eighty one survivors were taken on by Northern Gem.

Admiral Tovey later remarked of the part Achates played in the defence of JW51B:
"I consider the action of Lieut. Commander A.H.T. Johns RN, and subsequently Lieutenant L.E. Peyton Jones RN, to have been gallant in the extreme. They only had one idea, to give what protection they could to the convoy, and this they continued to do up to the moment of sinking. The behaviour of all officers and ratings was magnificent."

On another occasion Admiral Tovey wrote:
Smoke laying may not appear a very exciting way of fighting but I know few things more unpleasant than being fired at when you cannot shoot back. . . The sinking of the smoke layer is essential if the enemy is to get a chance of damaging the convoy and the Achates was constantly coming under heavy fire, but she stuck to her job right up to the time she sank – truly a noble little ship and company.”


The convoy
At about 13.00 on the 31st, the convoy, which had been heading southwards, turned to the SE, resuming its course to Murmansk. At 19.30, Onslow being too damaged to be of much assistance, was detached to make her way there independently to disembark her casualties.

During the following night, the weather slowly deteriorated, and by 07.30 on 1st January, heavy seas and near gale force winds slowed their progress. At 11.00 they turned to the south and an hour later were joined by the missing Vizalma and Chester Valley.

At first light on the 2nd January, land was sighted and at 13.00, those ships bound for Archangel left the convoy and followed to coast round to their destination. The next morning between 05.00 and 09.00 most of the convoy entered Murmansk harbour, despite several air raid warnings. Stragglers were rounded up, but Ballot had run aground, and even the efforts of two Russian tugs couldn’t free her, so she had to be unloaded by lighters.

Every merchantman of convoy JW51B completed the journey unharmed apart from Colobre which had received some splinter damage from one of Lutzow‘s shells.


HMS Onslow
When, at 10.30 on the 31st, the damaged Onslow was despatched to the front of the convoy, she was on fire forward with flames and smoke belching from the forecastle, and with forty of her crew dead. It was not until 14.00 that the fires were under control, and at 14.30 they were extinguished altogether. But due to the amount of water used to put out the fires, she had developed a ten degree list to port. So no 7 oil tank and the forward shell room were flooded to bring her back on an even keel. Water still entering when she rolled to port was kept under control by pumping, but if the weather deteriorated she would be in danger of foundering.

At 19.30, she was detached from the convoy, to proceed independently to Murmansk, arriving at the Kola Inlet at 08.30 the next day and tied up at the Royal Navy base at Vaenga at noon, where the casualties were disembarked and taken to an RN auxiliary hospital which had been set up there.

On 3rd January, a Russian technical mission arrived to assess the damage and arrange for repairs, but didn't believe she had been in action with a German 8" cruiser until the base of an 8" shell was found and measured. On the 8th January, Onslow was moved to Rosta where temporary repairs were made to make her seaworthy.

Onslow eventually sailed on the 29th with the return convoy RA52, but she was detached three days later to return to Britain "at best speed". When she arrived at Scapa Flow on the 4th February, Lieutenant-Commander Marchant (who had taken over command when Sherbrooke was injured) was surprised to receive a signal from Admiral Fraser on Anson "Pass close to me". As she did so, Anson's entire complement lined the sides and cheered her. This was repeated on the next in line, the battleship Malaya, and on every other ship of the Home Fleet.


Captain Sherbrooke
Captain Sherbrook received treatment at the Vaenga hospital, but due to the seriousness of his facial injuries (he had lost his left eye and still had the piece of shell splinter embedded in the bridge of his nose which was too dangerous to remove) it was decided to take him on Obedient as quickly as possible back to Britain. On the 10th January, news was received that Sherbrooke had been awarded the Victoria Cross, and the next day Obedient sailed, arriving without incident.

From the London Gazette of 8 January 1943:

"The KING has been graciously pleased to approve the award of the VICTORIA CROSS, for valour in the defence of a convoy, to:

Captain Robert St. Vincent Sherbrooke, D.S.O., Royal Navy.

Captain Sherbrooke, in H.M.S Onslow, was the Senior Officer in command of the destroyers escorting an important convoy bound for North Russia. On the morning of 31st December, off the North Cape, he made contact with a greatly superior enemy force which was attempting to destroy the convoy.

Captain Sherbrooke led his destroyers into attack and closed the Enemy. Four times the Enemy tried to attack the convoy, but was forced each time to withdraw behind a smoke screen to avoid the threat of torpedoes, and each time Captain, Sherbrooke pursued him and drove him outside range of the convoy and towards our covering forces.

These engagements lasted about two hours, but after the first forty minutes, H.M.S. Onslow was hit, and Captain Sherbrooke was seriously wounded in the face and temporarily lost the use of one eye. Nevertheless, he continued to direct his ships under his command until further hits on his own ship compelled him to disengage, but not until he was satisfied that the next Senior Officer had assumed control. It was only then that he agreed to leave the bridge for medical attention, and until the convoy was out of danger he insisted on receiving all reports of the action.

His courage, his fortitude and his cool and prompt decisions inspired all around him. By his leadership and example the convoy was saved from damage and was brought safely to its destination
."
Sherbrooke.jpg

Other awards
In addition to the VC awarded to Sherbrooke, Lieutenant Commander Marchant and five other Onslow officers including the surgeon received the DSC. The commanders and second-in-command of Obedient, Obdurate, Orwell, Achates all received DSOs, as did the commanders of Sheffield and Jamaica.

There were also many DSCs, DSMs and MIDs awarded, many posthumously for Achates' men. There was one CGM awarded, and that was to ERA Hawksworth of Achates.


Postscript

Admiral Tovey, on 25 January 1943 wrote:
The conduct of all officers and men of the escort and covering forces throughout this successful action against greatly superior forces was in accordance with the traditions of the service. That an enemy force of at least one pocket battleship, one heavy cruiser and six destroyers, with all the advantage of surprise and concentration, should be held off for four hours by five destroyers and driven from the area by two 6” cruisers, without any loss to the convoy, is most creditable and satisfactory.

The defence of convoy JW51B (now more widely know as the Battle of the Barents Sea, but which was really a series of skirmishes) by a few destroyers (only three in the latter stages plus two light cruisers) against a far superior enemy force, is a classic example of how destroyers should be handled in such a situation. Much of the credit goes to Captain Sherbrooke and his command of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla. Not the least part of this was the instilling of his ideas into the other commanders of how the defence should be conducted, that enabled his tactics to continue to be applied after he had been struck down.

As Admiral Tovey wrote:
"The Battle of the Barents Sea was one of the finest examples in either of the two World Wars of how to handle destroyers and cruisers in action with heavier forces. Captain Sherbrooke saved his convoy by going straight to attack his far heavier enemy, using his guns to do what damage they could but relying on his torpedoes, the real menace to heavier ship, to deter them from closing the convoy. Sherbrooke knew that the threat was lost once his torpedoes were fired. When in position for firing he turned his ships to simulate an attack - the mere threat was sufficient to persuade the enemy to break off their attack. . . When Captain Sherbrooke was himself put out of action his second in command, and when his wireless failed the next in command, continued the same tactics."

So far as can be determined, no torpedoes were launched by any British ship in this action, which illustrates the potency of "a torpedo in being"; or to misquote an old saying, “a torpedo in the tube is worth two in the water”.

-----“-----

(to be continued)
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

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The Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)


(Part 6)

In retrospect

The German Naval Staff, though no doubt pressed in that direction by Hitler, seems to have shown a remarkable aptitude for depriving its sea-going commanders of all initiative.” – Roskill, “The War at Sea”.

There are several aspects of the performance of the German forces in this action which can be justly criticised, but it is necessary to understand the conditions under which their commanders were operating in order to obtain a balanced perspective.

Even before Hipper had left harbour, Kummetz was reminded by Admiral Kluber of the standard procedure on meeting an enemy: “avoid a superior force, otherwise destroy according to tactical situation”. Additionally, he emphasised the danger from torpedoes to Hipper and Lutzow because their tracks would be difficult to see in the half light

Almost immediately after putting to sea Kummetz received another signal from Kluber, “Contrary to the operational order regarding contact against the enemy, you are to use caution even against enemy of equal strength because it is undesirable for the cruisers to take any great risks.”

After the two groups had separated in the early hours of the 31st, Lutzow’s Captain Stange, received further orders from Admiral Kluber informing him that Lutzow was to conduct Operation Aurora, a "cruiser war, detect enemy shipping traffic, attack single cruisers and poorly secured escorts. . . . Proceed only if Lutzow has at least half of artillery and torpedo ammunition left."

Stange said of this signal: “The receipt of this signal creates a new situation for me in so far as contrary to original plans . . . it is now no longer possible to talk the operation through with B.d.K. (Kummetz) in detail, neither can I request documents about the enemy from him . . .”

It is reasonable to conclude that the effect of all of this was to substitute caution for daring in both commanders. Thus Kummetz and Stange had to consider carefully every encounter before committing to action, resulting in an overly cautious approach.

But Kluber hadn't finished, while Hipper was still engaged in its first action with Force R, he sent yet another reminder, “No unnecessary risk”. Later, Kummetz received another signal from Admiral Kluber, “Return at high speed. Two enemy cruisers confirmed in Murmansk area. One of them Jamaica.” This over reaction to the possibility of meeting two light cruisers, clearly illustrates how risk averse the High Command were. It seems that protecting its ships was now more important to them than destroying the enemy, thus undermining its own operations.

To be fair, Kluber was merely the conduit, passing on the High Command’s caution to Kummetz, But it should have been sufficient for Kluber to give Kummetz his orders beforehand and leave him to get on with it, but he didn't, sending two further signals urging caution!

To his credit, Kummmetz's actions show little sign of being unduly cautious, as evidenced by his sinking of Bramble and Achates, the disabling of Onslow, and firing on the convoy when he could. His repeated backing away from the approach of the escort destroyers, while usually described as cautious, was not due to risk aversion, but the implementation of his tactics to draw the destroyers away from the convoy for as long as possible. Although the destroyers refused to be tempted too far away, it served his purpose to keep them occupied for a long time. In this he was mainly successful, and cannot be blamed for the failure of "Regenbogen".

With Stange in the Lutzow it was different. He displayed such caution that he could be accused of being almost unwilling to fight. As has been mentioned, Kummetz's plan had succeeded perfectly, and with Lutzow positioned within three miles of the almost unprotected convoy, all that was needed was for Stange's force to apply the coup de grace. But he didn't.

Stange had already been informed by Kummetz, “Hipper to north of convoy and there are four enemy destroyers between us and the convoy”. Therefore, the multiple radar contacts seen from the Lutzow could only have been from the convoy. Stange excused himself by saying that he couldn't identify a clear target. That may be true, and the need to preserve his ammunition for Operation Aurora may also have been at the back of his mind; but it was no excuse for doing nothing. He could have sent his destroyers in, or speculatively fired a few salvoes of torpedoes. His complete lack of action at this point condemned "Regenbogen" to failure.

Stange himself was disappointed by his own performance, writing, “As we withdrew from the scene of the action, the unsatisfactory feeling reigned that, in spite of the general position, which was apparently favourable at first, we had not succeeded at getting at the convoy or in scoring any success at all.


The destroyers
Another puzzling feature of this ‘battle’ is the inactivity of the German destroyers, apparently serving no purpose, mainly following in the wake of the heavy units. They could have been used more aggressively as each of them out-gunned and out-ranged each of the British destroyers, and after Onslow was disabled at 10.20, outnumbered them by two to one, as there were only three left capable of fighting.

They could for example, have been used to screen the cruisers aggressively by taking on the escort destroyers, keeping them occupied while the cruisers got at the convoy. The caution urged upon the commanders from above applied to capital ships and did not, so far as can be determined, extend to the destroyers. The adage that “attack is the best form of defence” seems to have been forgotten.

Kummetz explains this passivity by saying that in the poor visibility, it was difficult to tell friend from foe, and to ensure that he did not fire on his own destroyers it was safer to keep them behind him. Stange obviously had the same thoughts.

But the visibility cannot have come as a surprise as these are normal conditions for this time of year. So one wonders why the destroyers were taken at all, as both heavy units could have just as easily operated by themselves alone, unhindered by their presence. It may even have been better if the destroyers alone had executed "Regenbogen", with the Hipper and Lutzow remaining in port.

"Had the German Naval Command been a little more aggressive they would have realised that they had been presented with a golden opportunity to inflict a significant defeat on their enemy's naval forces, plus the destruction of a convoy." – Pearson, "Red Sky in the Morning".

For the Kriegsmarine there was no gold at the end of this Rainbow.

-----“-----
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

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The Battle of the Barents Sea – 31 December 1942
(The Defence of Convoy JW51B)


The Aftermath

Reporting the battle
Hitler had long been dissatisfied with the performance of the Kriegsmarine; only days before the action he described its ships as "lying idle in the fiords, utterly useless like so much old iron". But when the opportunity arose to destroy a weakly guarded enemy convoy he became interested and demanded to be kept informed of the progress.

Around midday on the 31st, Kummetz's signal "break off engagement and retire to the westward", and U354's message "the battle has reached its climax. I can see only red." were received, they were interpreted as signifying a great success, and Hitler wanted to know all the details.

But the first news came from the British in a Reuter report of 20.00 the same day which stated "Early today British ships came in contact with enemy forces in Northern waters. During the ensuing battle one enemy cruiser was damaged and withdrew. One enemy destroyer was hit several times and when she was last seen was in a sinking condition. Operations continue.", which seemed to counter the German expectation of “success”.

Hitler was impatient for news and wanted to know why Kummetz hadn't reported. So, despite a standing order to maintain radio silence, at 02.45 on 1st January, Kummetz received "Emergency. Request brief preliminary survey by w/t of successes and situation, even before sending short report." Hitler demanded to be told the moment a reply was received.

Kummetz didn't reply until 04.10, when he had reached Norwegian waters, and then with only the briefest of reports. At 10.15 he received another signal "Request urgently additional information to that given in Hipper's short report as this is required by Naval Staff."

Kummetz, unaware of the mood of Hitler and the consequent tensions in the High Command, sent off his reply at 12.15, which didn't improve matters, merely adding a few details about the ships and men, but made no mention of the convoy, which is what Hitler really wanted to know. Admiral Raeder blamed faulty telephone lines and radio communications for the delay in bringing further news. By now Hitler began to suspect that the Kriegsmarine were withholding information from him and his patience was wearing thin.

At 17.00, with no further news from Altenfiord on the success or failure of the attack, Hitler fumed, saying it was an unheard of impudence not to inform him; that such behaviour and the entire action showed that the ships were utterly useless; that they were nothing but a breeding ground for revolution, idly lying about and lacking any desire to get into action.

Meanwhile, Kummetz had spent the afternoon collating the reports of every ship’s commander to produce a detailed report which, due to its length, was necessary to split into three parts for transmission. The nearest secure teleprinter connected to land was aboard the cruiser Koln, and in taking the report there by boat for transmission, there followed a series of mishaps. First, the boat’s engine broke down delaying them for over an hour; then when the Koln was reached, it was discovered that she had not yet received the new codes that were regularly changed on the first day of every the month (this being the 1st January), so the boat then had to make a fifteen mile trip to the naval base on the mainland.

Kummetz’s report was finally received in Berlin at 19.00, three hours late, and was shown to Hitler whose reaction was predictable. At a later meeting that day, after castigating the Kriegsmarine, he declared that this was the end of the German Fleet and ordered Grand Admiral Raeder to report to him immediately to be told personally of his irrevocable decision. But the Naval Staff succeeded in delaying the meeting until the monthly conference on the 6th, to allow Hitler’s anger to subside, and Raeder to prepare his response.

The next day, (2nd January) reacting to the Reuter report, a communiqué was issued which read:
German naval forces near Bear Island, in the Arctic, attacked a British naval formation consisting of cruisers and destroyers escorting a convoy. In the course of the battle, lasting several hours, our cruisers damaged several enemy cruisers and destroyers as well as merchant ships by artillery.

Observation of this success was made difficult by weather conditions. An enemy destroyer damaged in the engagement was sunk by a German destroyer. A German U-boat torpedoed four ships of the convoy but could not observe the sinkings owing to the conditions of the engagement. One of our destroyers has failed to return from this engagement
.”

The destroyer referred to as sunk, was in fact the minesweeper Bramble; they hadn't realised that the destroyer Achates had also sunk after they had departed.


A momentus conference

At the naval conference held on the 6th January 1943, Hitler started off by talking for one and a half hours about the role played by the Prussian and German navies since they came into existence, detailing their failures since the mid 19th century, adding that the High Seas Fleet had made no notable contribution in the World War.

He went on to say that the real reason was that the Navy lacked men of action who were determined to fight. As a result of this inactivity a large amount of fighting-power lay idle, while the Army was constantly heavily engaged. The Navy always considered the number of their own ships and men as compared with the enemy before entering an engagement. The Army does not follow this principle, and he demands that, once forces have been committed to action, the battle be fought to a decision.

Due to the present critical situation, where all fighting power, all personnel, and all material must be brought into action, large ships cannot be permitted to ride idly at anchor for months. They require constant protection by the Air Force, and the same situation would hold true in the case of an invasion of Norway, where the Air Force would be of more value in attacking an invasion fleet than in protecting the German fleet. For this reason, the fleet would not be of great value in preventing the enemy from establishing a beachhead. Until now light naval forces have been doing most of the fighting.

He then came to his main point, saying that nothing would be lost if he decided to scrap the large ships. The coastal defence could use the guns from these large ships very effectively. Heavy naval guns, if mounted where invasions on a large scale would be practical, could possibly prevent such landings. The Kriegsmarine therefore shall consider the following, and Grand Admiral Raeder shall prepare a memorandum giving his views.

1. Should the three aircraft carriers which were planned, be retained?
Should other ships be converted into aircraft carriers?
Are the Hipper and the Prinz Eugen, because of their great speed, more suited than the Luetzow and the Scheer, which have a more extensive operating radius?
If the latter were lengthened, could they develop greater speed and could they be given a larger landing deck?
2. Where would the heavy guns of these ships best be mounted on land?
3. In which order should the ships be decommissioned? Probably the Gneisenau would be the first, since she will not be ready for active duty until the end of 1944. Next would probably be the ships which are now due for overhauling and repairs. Personnel of these ships will remain with the Navy.
4. Can the submarine programme be extended and speeded up if the large ships are eliminated?


Without arguing with him, and thinking that with time Hitler could be persuaded to modify his demands, Raeder carried out his instructions, and on 15th January presented a memorandum on the decommissioning of the big ships. At the same time he also presented a simple guide on the use of sea power, resisting Hitler’s intentions - but to no avail. This conflict between Hitler and Raeder brought to an end Raeder’s long and unsuccessful attempt to make Hitler appreciate the use of sea power.

Accordingly, on 30th January 1943, Raeder resigned his command, which he had held for nearly fifteen years, and Hitler appointed Admiral Doenitz as his successor.


The new Commander-in-Chief
As a welcome present, Hitler handed Doenitz a prepared memorandum outlining his plans for the Kriegsmarine which informed him that:

1. All construction and conversion of heavy ships is to cease with immediate effect.
2. Battleships, pocket battleships, heavy cruisers and light cruisers to be paid off.
3. The resultant dockyard capacity, workmen, seamen and weapons, rendered available, to be applied to an intensification of U-boat repair and U-boat construction.

An interesting start to his new job!

At the first conference on 8th February between Doenitz and Hitler, the whole of the war at sea was reviewed, and as a result Doenitz prepared a timetable for decommissioning most of the big ships. A summary of which was:

Hipper and Koln were to be paid off on 1st March 1943.
Schleswig-Holstein was to be paid off on 1st April 1943.
Schlesien was to be paid off on 1st May 1943.
Scharnhorst was to be paid off on 1st July 1943.
Tirpitz was to be paid off in Autumn 1943.

This meant that only Tirpitz, Lutzow, and Nurnberg would be left operational in Norwegian waters until August 1943, and only Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen in the Baltic. The latter ship was to be turned into a training ship in May 1943. Prinz Eugen, Scheer, Leipzig and Emden were only to have as much work done on them as would enable them to be used as training ships.

This would release 250 officers, of whom 92 could be used for U-boat service, and 8,000 petty officers and men, who would be used for U-boats, for coastal and flak batteries and as replacements in the remaining surface ships. 1,300 dockyard workmen would also become available for work on destroyers, M-boats, and U-boat repairs.

Doentiz clearly understood the problems with which sea-going commanders had with the restrictions placed upon them. He went on to talk about the question of the future commitment of heavy ships, saying that he has the responsibility to order heavy ships to battle as soon as a worthwhile target and chance of success appeared. Once ordered to sea, the officer in command would have to act and fight entirely on his own initiative according to the tactical situation without awaiting special instruction from above. Under such circumstances one would have to expect losses. Hitler expressed his complete approval.


Doenitz manoeuvres
Doenitz, who was much better at playing politics than Raeder, and knowing Hitler's concern for the Eastern Front, three weeks later cleverly obtained Hitler’s approval for modifying his original instructions. At a conference held 26th February, he reported:

"The Fuehrer has previously decided that we cannot afford to let our large ships lie idle, since they are not in a position to engage in combat. As a result of this decision, the following were decommissioned: the Hipper, the Leipzig, and the Koln. These will be followed shortly by the Schlesien and the Schleswig-Holstein.

The C.-in-C., Navy, is however, of the opinion that the Archangel convoys would make excellent targets for the large ships, and he considers it his duty, in view of the heavy fighting on the Eastern Front, to exploit these possibilities to the fullest extent. He therefore considers it essential that the Scharnhorst be sent to Norway to strengthen the forces there. The Tirpitz, the Scharnhorst, and for the present the Lutzow, together with six destroyers, would be a fairly powerful task force
."

Hitler was opposed to any further engagements of the surface ships since, beginning with the Graf Spee, one defeat has followed another. Large ships are a thing of the past. He would prefer to have the steel and nickel contained in them rather than send them into action again.

When Doenitz mentioned that ships were severely limited by the imposed restriction that they must not be damaged or sacrificed, Hitler replied that he had never issued an order restricting commanding officers in this manner. (True, but he had made his feelings clear many times which, in Nazi Germany, amounted to the same thing.) However, he no longer valued their effectiveness. By way of contrast he explained how bitterly the army fought on the Eastern Front, and how unbearable it was to see the strength of the Russians constantly increased by convoys reaching their destinations.

Doenitz now played his master card, suggesting that, instead of decommissioning the heavy ships, he would consider it his duty to send them into action whenever possible and as long as suitable targets could be found. Hitler finally agreed to let the Scharnhorst join the ships in Norway. He asked Doenitz how long it would be before a suitable target would be found, to which he replied that he thought in the next three months. Hitler replied: “Even if it should require six months, you will then return and be forced to admit that I was right.”

Ultimately, other than three modern cruisers (Hipper, Leipzig, Koln) and two old battleships (Schlesien and Schleswig Holstein), the wholesale scrapping of the heavy ships didn’t take place. Doenitz had played his cards well.


Unforeseen consequences

Of course, none of the above was known to the British until after the end of war. It was learned only later that this crisis in the German Navy was precipitated directly by the successful defence of convoy JW51B.

Sherbrooke, when planning his tactics for defending the convoy, would have been satisfied alone with them being successful - it was just another job. Other than the convoy's safe arrival, no one could possibly have foretold what the consequences of such a successful defence would be.

In thwarting the sustained attack on the convoy by a vastly superior force for three hours until Force R arrived on the scene, the few destroyers of the 17th Flotilla had effectively achieved, by their tactical manoeuvres, a strategic defeat upon the whole Kriegsmarine and the resignation of its Commander-in-Chief.

-----“-----
(End)
Best wishes
Bill
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jbryce1437
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

Unread post by jbryce1437 »

Many thanks for this episode Bill. A sterling effort by the escorts and all of the awards were well earned.
Many thanks for your research into the battle.

Jim
HMS Raleigh 1963 , HMS Collingwood 1963 & 67 , HMS Ark Royal 1964-7, HMS Undaunted 1968-71, HMS Victory (Fleet Maintenance Group) 1971-72, HMS Exmouth 1972-74
JEM, EM, OEM, LOEM, POOEL
Then 28 years in the Fire Brigade
Retired since 2002
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emason
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

Unread post by emason »

jbryce1437 wrote: Thu Jul 22, 2021 8:54 pm Many thanks for this episode Bill. A sterling effort by the escorts and all of the awards were well earned.
Many thanks for your research into the battle.
Jim
Thank you Jim - much appreciated. :D
Best wishes
Bill
greendragon
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Re: The Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942)

Unread post by greendragon »

There is nothing to be added to the excellent material about the battle.

I have found one more detail connected to the event.
This reflects the British sense of humor .
The survivor from HMS Achates remembers that after entering Scapa Flow loudspeakers of HMS Onslow played well known in those times "I missed you" hit which was intended to say that all the HF battleships, carriers (except two light cruisers), etc rested safely in the base while couple of destroyers fought unequal duel with powerfull and overwhelmig German force of warships.


gd
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