Royal Navy nuclear submarine technology to be shared with Australia
A new trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) was announced yesterday. As part of this new alliance, the US and UK will assist with the construction of up to 8 nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). In this brief commentary, we outline some of the implications.
The new alliance has been largely driven by the increasing threat from China. Australian relations with the Chinese have deteriorated considerably and the rapidly expanding PLA Navy poses a growing threat that would most effectively be countered by a powerful submarine force. With a shared language, history and value system, AUKUS makes sense and is an extension of the existing ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence-sharing agreement. At this time there is not, however, an equivalent of NATO’s Article Five that specifically commits each nation to send military forces to protect the other in event of an attack by a third party. Should China continue its rate of military expansion it is possible that it may drive Indo-Pacific nations to form a more committed NATO-like alliance with AUKUS at its heart.
AUKUS is another step for post-Brexit Britain, becoming more closely aligned with its traditional allies in the Anglosphere as it distances from former EU partners. There is also the potential of economic benefits for the UK at the expense of the French, at a time when Macron is increasingly unloved by London.
The Royal Australian Navy needs to replace its conventional Collins class (SSK) boats and under its SEA 1000 project, in April 2016 signed a A$50 billion contract with the French Naval Group to build up to 12 Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A boats. Any submarine construction project needs strong political and financial backing as well as talented managers and leaders to deliver successfully. It is one of the most difficult engineering challenges that any nation can undertake, given the complexities of design and the skills and infrastructure needed to build maintain and operate them. Even Spain, with a history of submarine building has struggled to deliver their S-80 AIP SSK and despite the UK’s strong naval heritage, encountered major problems and delays to the Astute class.
The “Attack class” project was always going to be problematic compared to those counties with existing domestic submarine programmes. Effectively the Attack programme added 3 extra hurdles: Converting the French Barracuda-class SSN design to a conventionally powered version, replacing the French combat systems with a new US/Aus designed option and a major technology and skills transfer from France to Australia. HMAS attack was supposed to have been laid down in 2023 and be the first of 3 batches of boats built over a 25-year period. The estimated cost of the programme had risen to A$80bn by 2020 and tension began to increase with Naval Group as the true scale of the task emerged.
The decision to build SSNs has not eliminated these issues, and in fact the cost and complexity of the task is magnified by the need to acquire supporting nuclear infrastructure. Australia has no civil nuclear industry to draw upon (nuclear power was formally banned by legislation in 1998). Historically it has adopted an anti-nuclear stance that included preventing warships from entering port if they were either nuclear powered or possibly carrying nuclear weapons.
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https://www.navylookout.com/royal-navy- ... australia/