Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

Submarines of the fleet
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Little h
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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ivorthediver wrote: Sat Mar 21, 2020 7:48 pm ok Harry , very grateful to you for investigating the facts , and giving us a heads up , when your time is at a premium ......still chuckling at the picture of you and you're Enamelled mug on a lanyard round your waist :lol:

Background to the Enamelled mug on a lanyard round your waist as follows:-
Enamel Mugs were the regulation that went along with being closed up at Defence Stations/Watches and/or Action Stations - it enabled the wearer to readily avail themselves of Kye from the fanny carrier and/or Pot Mess from either the Galley or the fanny carrier.

1959 - GRAHAM BEER, KEPPEL, 7 MESS paint (2).jpg

..... and there is the said mug - located in my locker at Ganges, atop my two Seamans Manuals and behind my open scissors
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Little h
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ivorthediver
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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Never doubted it Dear Sir ..... :D , thanks harry ......great shot of the Mess , and a nice tidy display there Sir ;)
"What Ever Floats your Boat"
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DaveH
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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It's where most of us started Ivor , it is said we went in as boys but came out a men ready for the fleet . We learnt discipline teamwork , respect . All attributes which would follow us thru'life . No "I" in our Teams , just respect for each other and others .

That mess could have been any mess in Ganges it was so competitive . I was Blake 8 top of the Long Covered Way 1953 .
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ivorthediver
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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Yes indeed Dave , what the youth of today might refer to as " manipulative Cloning of human rights" , but it would have been a good grounding to the idiots and thugs which contaminate each generation through life .

I remember an interesting argument I overheard once about rounding them all up and putting them through National Service and make real men of them ... , to which the response was "Why should we pollute the cream of human endeavour "..........got my vote .

Better go know or be told were off topic :oops:
"What Ever Floats your Boat"
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Little h
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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Report on the investigation of the near miss between the ro-ro ferry Stena Superfast VII and a submerged Royal Navy submarine in the North Channelon 6 November 2018

MARINE INCIDENT REPORT NO 13/2020 JULY 2020

SECTION 3– CONCLUSIONS

3 .1 SAFETY ISSUES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS


1.Until avoiding action was taken by Stena Superfast VII’s OOW, there was a serious risk of collision between a laden ferry and a submerged Royal Navy submarine. [2.3.4]
2.Stena Superfast VII passed inside the submarine’s go-deep range, therefore, it was unsafe for the submarine to remain at periscope depth. [2.3.3]
3.It was extremely fortunate that Stena Superfast VII’s bridge AB spotted the submarine’s periscope, though there was no reasonable expectation he would do so. [2.3.4]
4.Safety-critical decisions on board the submarine, specifically to turn towards the ferry and remaining at periscope depth, were taken based on inaccurate information. [2.3.1, 2.3.3]
5.Overestimation of the ferry’s range and underestimation of its speed resulted in the submarine’s command system presenting an inaccurate surface picture. However, this situation meant that the unsafe decisions might have seemed rational at the time. [2.3.3]
6.The submarine’s command team and the command qualified FOST sea rider demonstrated a bias towards the safer SMCS track that was based upon visual overestimations of the ferry’s range. This bias created a situation where other clues to the close proximity of the ferry could be ignored. [2.3.3] [2.4.2]
7.Perceived pressure to remain at periscope depth for training purposes might also have influenced the decision not to go deep. [2.3.3]
8.Although the submarine’s passage plan had identified the North Channel ferry hazard and the commanding officer had directed the OOW to remain south of the ferry lanes, the submarine was actually operating in the hazardous area. [2.4.1]

3.2 OTHER SAFETY ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS

1.The key similarity between this incident and two previous collisions involving Royal Navy submarines was the absence of a sufficiently accurate picture of surface shipping to support safety-critical decision-making. [2.4.3]
2.Although intended to provide assurance of safe operations, the embarked FOST command sea rider did not advise or intervene to ensure the safety of the submarine. [2.4.2]


SECTION 4– ACTION TAKEN

4 .1 ROYAL NAVY ACTIONS

4 .1.1 Actions in response to this incidentPost this incident the RN reported that the following actions had been taken:

●FOST shore-based simulator training was updated to enhance the management of close quarters situations with merchant or fishing vessels.
●Submarine command teams were briefed on the critical importance of operating safely at periscope depth in coastal waters. This included a brief on the facts of this case to raise awareness of the potential risks posed to submarines and other vessels nearby.
●Comprehensive learning from experience (LfE) events were delivered to submarine command teams prior to proceeding to sea.
●Training and documentation for the operational use of AIS was reviewed.
●FOST training was amended to ensure that, if a close quarters procedure was commenced, this was run to conclusion and not interrupted.
●Incident reporting procedures have been reviewed and the amended policy reiterated to the submarine flotilla; commanding officers are also briefed on reporting requirements prior to taking command.
●The decision to conduct safety training in areas of known high density shipping was reviewed and found to be justified. However, direction was given that a formal risk assessment should be conducted by FOST prior to safety training commencing.
●All submarines operating near known shipping lanes and when operational circumstances permit, were recommended to use radar to provide increased accuracy of ranging.
Little h
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ivorthediver
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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And there was me thinking the you had forgotten all about this Harry :o .......you would have thought we would have known better by know eh me ole mate :oops: ..........

Congratulations and well done Harry Forever the alert and thorough observer that you are .......forever on watch eh

A double awaits you in the Bar Harry :D
"What Ever Floats your Boat"
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jbryce1437
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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Many thanks for the heads up Harry.
I noted the last line of the report:
Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

Jim
HMS Raleigh 1963 , HMS Collingwood 1963 & 67 , HMS Ark Royal 1964-7, HMS Undaunted 1968-71, HMS Victory (Fleet Maintenance Group) 1971-72, HMS Exmouth 1972-74
JEM, EM, OEM, LOEM, POOEL
Then 28 years in the Fire Brigade
Retired since 2002
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Little h
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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jbryce1437 wrote: Thu Jul 16, 2020 4:56 pm Many thanks for the heads up Harry.
I noted the last line of the report:
Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

Jim
IIRC it is always included in MAIB reports Jim.

Clearly RN should shoulder the blame; a) a FOST Sea Rider was in the Control Room and was Command qualified but did not intervene; b) the visual range does not appear to have been tested against the other sensor ranging info; and the Able Seaman on watch as Stena bridge lookout sighted the periscope and the OOW on same bridge observed the wake direction of the periscope.

I'm left wondering if that boat was going to use the Stena ship as a hot target then one set of range info was thoroughly incorrect .... might the result be incorrect torpedo settings!!

Plenty to worry about methinks.
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Little h
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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Jul 16, 2020,04:48am EDT
Royal Navy Submarine In Incident With Ferry Identified

H I Sutton Contributor
Aerospace & Defense
I cover the changing world of underwater warfare.

Britain’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch has published a report on a 2018 near miss between a Royal Navy submarine and a passenger ferry. The ferry is named, obviously, but the submarine is not. Based on the images of the mast, however, we can identify the type of submarine involved.

---------------------------------------------------------------

The mast matches the type found on a Vanguard Class ballistic missile submarine. Submarine expert Richard W. Stirn specializes in documenting submarine masts and sensors. He identified it as the CK51 optronics mast made by Thales. This is like a digital periscope, and it is found aboard the Vanguard class. Other Royal Navy submarines, of the Astute Class and Trafalgar Class, have different masts.

Recognizing a submarine based solely on its mast is a skill used by navies. If you imagine that you are in a patrol aircraft, the masts might be the only part of the enemy submarine which you can see. These same skills can be applied here.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

The incident involved the ferry Stena Superfast VII, which was crossing the North Channel between Belfast in Northern Ireland and Cairnryan in Scotland. The report concludes, “This incident happened because the submarine’s control room team overestimated the ferry’s range and underestimated its speed.” The submarine was conducting routine pre-deployment safety training.

Source; forbes.com where the full article complete with diagrams (copyright) can be read/viewed.

______________________________________________________________________

see also:-

NavyLookout
@NavyLookout
Marine Accident Investigation Branch publishes report on near miss between ferry Stena Superfast VII and a submerged
RN Vanguard class submarine conducting pre-deployment training.

(North Channel, 6 Nov 2018)

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.u ... marine.pdf

(............. and all the tweeted responses including retweeted links)
Little h
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Little h
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Re: Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigation opened

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Little h wrote: Thu Jul 16, 2020 8:54 pm
jbryce1437 wrote: Thu Jul 16, 2020 4:56 pm Many thanks for the heads up Harry.
I noted the last line of the report:
Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

Jim
IIRC it is always included in MAIB reports Jim.

Clearly RN should shoulder the blame; a) a FOST Sea Rider was in the Control Room and was Command qualified but did not intervene; b) the visual range does not appear to have been tested against the other sensor ranging info; and the Able Seaman on watch as Stena bridge lookout sighted the periscope and the OOW on same bridge observed the wake direction of the periscope.

I'm left wondering if that boat was going to use the Stena ship as a hot target then one set of range info was thoroughly incorrect .... might the result be incorrect torpedo settings!!

Plenty to worry about methinks.
Periscope radar ranging (pulse burst); I recall detecting same on many occasions ... but again left wondering if the RN SSBN (bombers) and SSN (attack) submarines are fitted with periscope radar ranging these days? as referred to in the following excerpts/legend:-

Development of a combined radar and optical periscope was started by Barr and Stroud in 1945 at the invitation of the Admiralty Signals Establishment. Following successful trials in HMS Fleetwood56/57 a radar pulse burst capability was developed and the first prototype was ready by 1950. After a further two iterations a working periscope for the T Class conversions was ready by 1954 in a CK17, bifocal, binocular night periscope with the JT1 periscope radar.58 However, despite being fitted in the T Class conversions , the Porpoise Class and even the Dreadnought , (later removed), and despite being used operationally successfully at least once, it was not popular with COs for its clear submarine characteristics were too easily detected and it required too much mast exposure especially during an attack.59

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

56. ADM 220/1080 Trials of experimental submarine periscope radar ranging system in HMS Fleetwood
57. GUA UGD 295/26/1/87 Dr. Strang's notes on history of Barr & Stroud Ltd Handwritten notes by Dr. Strang relate to similar but different trials. According to Dr. Strang's record the Admiralty conducted trials at Eastney against a specification requiring the radar to have a satisfactory echo at 8,000yds. In fact, ranges greater than this were achieved with the target frigate being asked to go further and further away until she complained she was in danger of running aground on the coast of France!
58. Moss and Russell, op. cit., pp. 154-156 and Thales: 100 years of submarine visual system innovation, a booklet printed in 2017 to celebrate 100 years of the company supplying periscopes to the Royal Navy.
59. https://www.rnsubmusfriends.org.uk Dits and Bits: Periscope Radar Ranging. The successful use was from HMS Tiptoe during operation Quiet Sentinel in 1969 when she ranged on a Russian ship.

Source; RN Subs Website of the Barrow Submariners Association - The History Of The British Submarine Periscope
by Commander David Parry
Little h
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