The 1845 Franklin Expedition to Find a North-West Passage

[emason]

The Franklin Expedition to the Arctic 1845–1848 (Part 1)

Prologue

The search for a northern, East to West sea route to the East Indies had occupied the trading nations since the late fifteenth century. This route became known as the Northwest Passage and, if found would shorten the sea journey by some 4,500 – 5,000 miles, or about two months for a round trip from Europe. Britain in the nineteenth century was built on industry and trade and the discovery of such a route had obvious commercial and naval advantages.

The waters of northern Canada are an archipelago of hundreds of islands; some small, some big. Looking at a map of the area it would seem that the most obvious route would be from Baffin Bay through Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville Sound, McClure Strait (collectively known as the Parry Channel) and into the Beaufort Sea. But the western end is blocked by permanent polar ice. Consequently, there is no one route that defines the Northwest Passage. There are at least five navigable routes and seven for smaller vessels, or would be if the ice melted in the few weeks of the short summer months.

NWpassage cropped.jpg

Earlier Expeditions

Prior to 1800 there had been many expeditions to northern Canada. Most notable were those of:-

1497 John Cabot
1576 Martin Frobisher
1583 Humphrey Gilbert
1585 John Davis
1612 Thomas Button
1615 Robert Bylot, William Baffin
1631 Luke Foxe
1631 Thomas James
1719 James Knight
1770 Samuel Hearne (Hudson Bay Company)
1776 James Cook
1791 George Vancouver

Exploration by land and sea after 1800 was undertaken mainly by the Admiralty, under the direction of Sir John Barrow, and some in cooperation with the Hudson Bay Company.

1818 John Ross
1819 William Edward Parry
1819 John Franklin (overland)
1821 William Edward Parry
1825 Frederick William Beechy
1825 John Franklin (overland)
1829 John Ross
1833 George Back
1837 Peter Warren Dease, Thomas Simpson (Hudson Bay Company)

Many of these names still survive as names of islands, sounds, straits, bays, capes, gulfs channels and rivers. By 1845 only about 300 miles of the Arctic coastline remained unexplored.


Franklin's Orders and Expedition Objectives.

The following are extracts from the Admiralty’s detailed 1845 instructions to Sir John Franklin.

“Her Majesty's Government having deemed it expedient that further attempt should be made for the accomplishment of a north-west passage by sea from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, of which passage a small portion only remains to be completed, . . .”

"On putting to sea, you are to proceed, in the first place, by such a route as from the wind and weather, you may deem to be the most suitable for despatch, to Davis' Strait, . . . You will then proceed in the execution of your orders into Baffin's Bay, and get as soon as possible to the western side of the Strait, . . . ."

"Lancaster Sound, and its continuation through Barrow's Strait, having been four times navigated without any impediment by Sir Edward Parry, and since frequently by whaling ships, will probably be found without any obstacles from ice or islands ; and Sir Edward Parry having also proceeded from the latter in a straight course to Melville Island, and returned without experiencing any, or very little, difficulty, it is hoped that the remaining portion of the passage, about 900 miles, to the Bhering's Strait may also be found equally free from obstruction; and in proceeding to the westward, therefore, you will not stop to examine any openings either to the northward or southward in that Strait, but continue to push to the westward without loss of time, in the latitude of about 74 ¼ degrees, till you have reached the longitude of that portion of the land on which Cape Walker is situated, or about 98 degrees west. From that point we desire that every effort be used to endeavour to penetrate to the southward and the westward in a course as direct towards Bhering's Strait as the position and extent of the ice, or the existence of land, at present unknown, may admit. . . ."

"We direct you to this particular part of the Polar Sea as affording the best prospect of accomplishing the passage to the Pacific, . . . but should your progress in the direction before ordered be arrested by ice of a permanent appearance, and that when passing the mouth of the Strait, between Devon and Cornwallis Islands, you had observed that it was open and clear of ice ; we desire that you will duly consider, . . . whether that channel might not offer a more practicable outlet from the Archipelago; . . . . and if you should have determined to winter in that neighbourhood, it will be a matter of your mature deliberation whether in the ensuing season you would proceed by the above-mentioned Strait, or whether you would persevere to the south-westward, according to the former directions. . . . . "

"For the purpose, not only of ascertaining the set of the currents in the Arctic Seas, but also of affording more frequent chances of hearing your progress, we desire that you frequently, after you have passed the latitude of 65 degrees north, and once every day when you shall be in an ascertained current, throw overboard a bottle or copper cylinder closely sealed, and containing a paper stating the date and position at which it is launched, and you will give similar orders to the commander of the "Terror," to be executed in case of separation ; and for this purpose, we have caused each ship to be supplied with papers, on which is printed, in several languages, a request that whoever may find it should take measures for transmitting it to this office. . . . "

“In the event of England becoming involved in hostilities with any other power during your absence, you are nevertheless clearly to understand that you are not on any account to commit any hostile act whatsoever, the expedition under your orders being only intended for the purpose of discovery and science.”

The Expedition Ships

The ships chosen for the expedition were HMS EREBUS and HMS TERROR. Both were designed as "bomb ships" for the naval bombardment of shore targets. The main armaments of three ton mortars had such a powerful recoil that the ships were considerably reinforced to withstand it. Thus they were suited for polar exploratory work by virtue of being stronger than other similar ships available at the time. They also had capacious holds for all of the stores that were needed and shallow drafts to get close in to shore.

Erebus and Terror 24 May 1845.jpg

H.M.S. EREBUS
Erebus was a three masted Hecla-class bomb ship of 372 tons, built in Pembroke dockyard, Wales in 1826.
Dimensions: length 105ft, width 28.5ft, draught 13.8 ft.
Armaments: 1 x 13" mortar, 1 x 10" mortar, 2 x 6pdr, 8 x 24pdr.
Complement: 67

H.M.S. TERROR
Terror was a three masted Vesuvius-class bomb ship of 325 tons, built in Topsham, England in 1813.
Dimensions: Length 102ft, width 27ft, draught 12.5ft.
Armaments: 1 x 13" mortar, 1 x 10" mortar, 2 x 6pdr, 8 x 24pdr.
Complement: 67

The two ships were no strangers to the polar regions, having recently sailed to the Antarctic with Sir James Clark Ross. In preparation for that voyage the admiralty dockyards had doubled the thickness of the ships decks with a layer of waterproof cloth being sandwiched in between the old and new layers. The interiors of the two ships were braced fore and aft with oak beams to resist and absorb shock from ice. The hulls were scraped clean and double planked and finally the keels were sheathed in extra thick copper plate. Triple strength canvas was fitted for the sails.

Nevertheless, for their Arctic expedition they were further modified with bows reinforced with iron plates and a retractable iron rudder and propeller to protect them from damage. They were also fitted with steam engines that enabled the ships to make 4 knots on their own power, a unique combined steam-based heating and distillation system for the comfort of the crew and to provide fresh water. They had libraries of more than 1,000 books, and three years' worth of conventionally preserved or tinned preserved food supplies.


The Ship’s Crews

Captain Sir John Franklin. Franklin, despite his previous Arctic experience, was not the first choice as expedition commander, being initially considered too old at the age of 59, but was the most experienced senior officer available.

Sir John Franklin 1845.jpg

Commander James Fitzjames, was given command of HMS Erebus.

Captain Francis Crozier, who had commanded HMS Terror during the Ross 1841–44 Antarctic expedition, was appointed executive officer and commander of HMS Terror.

Most of the crew were Englishmen, many of them from the North Country, with a small number of Irishmen and Scotsmen. Many of them had been on previous Polar expeditions. Apart from Franklin and Crozier, the only other officers who were Arctic veterans were an assistant surgeon and the two ice-masters.

In all there were 24 officers and 110 men.

Officers.jpg

The Expedition Sets Sail

The Franklin Expedition, consisting of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror, set sail from Greenhithe, England, on the morning of 19 May 1845. They were accompanied by the transport ship Barretto Junior, HMS Monkey and HMS Rattler. The ships stopped briefly in the Orkney Islands, and from there they sailed to Greenland; HMS Monkey returning to England.

At the Whalefish Islands in Disko Bay, on the west coast of Greenland, 10 oxen carried by the transport ship were slaughtered for fresh meat; supplies were transferred to Erebus and Terror, and crew members wrote their last letters home. Provisions for three years were transferred which included 8000 tins, varying in capacity from 1 to 8 lb, of pemmican, cooked beef, cooked pork, preserved meat and soup, and 930 gallons of lemon juice.

Before the expedition's final departure, on 12th July 1845, five men were discharged and sent home on the transport ship and HMS Rattler, reducing the ships' final crew size to 129.

The expedition was last seen by Europeans on 26 July 1845, moored to an iceberg in Baffin Bay with the observatory set up upon it, by Captain Dannett of the whaler Prince of Wales and Captain Robert Martin of the whaler Enterprise. Franklin was awaiting good conditions to cross into Lancaster Sound.

Nothing was ever heard again from Franklin or his men.


The Basic Facts of What happened next

From their last sighting the expedition sailed into Lancaster Sound, passing Devon Island.

Where they went next in 1845 is a matter of conjecture. What is known is that they overwintered in Erebus Bay on Beechey Island off the southwest coast of Devon Island 1845-46.

At some point (either 1845 or 1846) they turned north into Wellington Channel (between Devon and Cornwallis islands). From there they sailed north until, at latitude 77N they could progress no further. They turned south and sailed down the west coast of Cornwallis Island, thus completing the first circumnavigation of Cornwallis Island.

From here they sailed south, presumably via Peel Sound and Franklin Strait, until 12 September 1846 when they became trapped in the ice off the northwest coast of King William Island.

In May 1847 Lieutenant Graham Gore left a brief note in a stone cairn near Victoria Point on King William Island. This gave their 1845 route and overwintering place as Beechey Island, and stated that all was well and that a party was setting out on a foot expedition.

ExpeditionMap2.jpg

That year, 1847, the ice did not melt and the ships remained firmly beset for a third arctic winter.

On 25 April 1848 an addition to the note was left by Fitzjames mentioning the death of nine officers and fifteen men, including that of Sir John Franklin aged 61 years on 11 July 1847. They were abandoning the ships and setting out on foot for Back’s Great Fish River (now called Back River) with 105 souls.

This decision was probably related to damage to the ships and/or the poor health of his men. Crozier planned to continue overland to the south of King William Island and then cross over the Simpson Strait to the Adelaide Peninsular and on to the Back River; a distance of about 300 miles.

Dragging life-boats on sledges with them, Crozier and his men progressed down the western and southern coasts of King William Island, travelling over the ice. Some died on the way and some reached the mainland, the remains of some thirty men being subsequently found at Starvation Cove, over 100 miles short of the Back River.

Not a single man survived. It appears that a combination of years of bad weather, exposure, hyperthermia and disease including probably pneumonia, tuberculosis, scurvy, and ultimately starvation had killed everyone in the Franklin party.

These are the known facts, or bare bones, of what is known about the expedition after its last sighting. How we know this will be told in part 2 - the organized searches for the Franklin expedition.

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[emason]

The Franklin Expedition to the Arctic 1845–1848 (Part 2)

Not until the end of 1847 was concern about Franklin's disappearance expressed by the Admiralty in London. Because the crew carried supplies for three years, the Admiralty waited until 1848 before launching a search to find the expedition. Between then and 1880 twenty-six expeditions, overland and by sea with some funded by Sir John's widow, were mounted in search of the Erebus and the Terror. Further searches, some as recently as 1980-1998, have helped reveal what probably happened to Franklin's ill-fated expedition.

In the period up to 1854 the British Navy lost five of its own ships plus another under charter: the total cost of the official searches exceeded £500,000, about eight times the cost of the original expedition. Eventually, more ships and men were lost looking for Franklin than in the expedition itself.

The Admiralty offered a reward of £20,000 "to any party or parties, of any country, who shall render assistance to the crews of the Discovery ships under the command of Sir John Franklin".

reward.jpg

The Early Searches

Searches with a primary objective of finding survivors of the Franklin expedition started in 1847 and continued until 1855, when it was concluded that there could be no survivors. After which the objective was to locate any surviving written records.

The following list contains only those expeditions which reached the Arctic. Others were abandoned for various reasons, mutiny, lack of funds etc.

1847 William Penny, Lancaster Sound, Private
1848-1849 John Richardson and John Rae, North Canadian coast, Admiralty
1848-1849 Sir John Clark Ross, Lancaster Sound, Admiralty
1848-1850 Henry Kellet, Bering Strait, Admiralty
1848-1852 Thomas Moore, Bering Strait, Admiralty
1849 William Penny, Lancaster Sound, Private
1849 Robert Shedden, Bering Strait, Private
1849-1851 William Pullen, Bering Strait, Admiralty
1850 Charles Forsyth, Prince Regent Inlet, Lady Franklin
1850-1851 Horatio Austin, Lancaster Sound, Admiralty
1850-1851 William Penny, Lancaster Sound, Admiralty
1850-1851 Sir John Ross, Lancaster Sound. Hudson Bay Company
1850-1851 Edwin De Haven, Lancaster Sound, Henry Grinnell (American philanthropist)
1850-1851 John Rae, Victoria Sound, Hudson Bay Company
1850-1854 Robert McClure, Bering Strait, Admiralty
1850-1855 Richard Collinson, Bering Strait, Admiralty
1851-1852 William Kennedy, Lancaster Sound, Lady Franklin
1852 Edward Inglefield, Smith and Jones Sounds, Lady Franklin
1852-1854 Sir Edward Belcher (5 vessels, lost 4), Lancaster Sound, Admiralty
1852-1854 Henry Kellet, Melville Sound, Admiralty
1852-1854 William Pullen, Lancaster Sound, Admiralty
1852-1854 Maguire, Bering Strait, Admiralty
1853-1854 John Rae, Boothia Peninsular, Hudson Bay Company
1853-1855 Elisha Kane, Smith Sound, Henry Grinnell
1855 James Anderson and James Stewart, Back River, Hudson Bay Company
1857-1859 Leopold McClintock, King William Island, Lady Franklin

Of these expeditions only four threw any light on Franklin’s fate. (Austin 1850-1851, Penny 1850-1851, Rae 1853-1854 and McLintock 1857-1859)

The following are some of the main searches.

The Three 1848-1849 Searches

The Admiralty organized three searches in the spring of 1848; an overland expedition and two expeditions by sea, one from the east, the other from the west. In addition, the Admiralty offered a reward of £20,000 "to any Party or Parties, of any country, who shall render assistance to the crews of the Discovery Ships under the command of Sir John Franklin".

The overland expedition, led by Sir John Richardson and Dr. John Rae of the Hudson Bay Company, was to travel down the MacKenzie River to the Canadian Arctic coast then eastwards for 800 miles to the Coppermine River. In 1850 they continued their search and examined the shores of Banks land, the coast about Cape Walker, and the north side of Victoria Land.

The eastern search from Lancaster Sound was by HMS Investigator and HMS Enterprise under Sir James Clark Ross. They sailed from England on 12 May 1848, explored the south side of Lancaster Sound as far as Cape York, and across the mouth of Prince Regent Inlet, wintered at Leopold harbor, and the following spring (1849) explored the shores of North Somerset, concluding that North Somerset and Boothia were united by a narrow isthmus, where Bellot Strait was afterward found. They also explored portions of the shore north of Barrow Strait, and both sides of Prince Regent Inlet. They returned in 1849 having found no trace of Franklin, his crews or his ships.

The western search from the Bering Straits was by HMS Plover (Commander Thomas Moore) and HMS Herald (Captain Kellett). They traversed the Bering Strait, and advanced to Chamisso Island in Kotzebue Sound arriving 14 July 1849, then on to Icy Point and examined the coast further to the eastward in boats. The explored the shore as far as Dease inlet, but found no traces of Franklin. The following summer (1850) the two vessels reexplored the same ground, but again without success.

The Two 1850-1851 Searches

To search from the east. HMS Assistance, HMS Intrepid, HMS Resolute and HMS Pioneer under overall command of Horatio Austin with supply ship HMS North Star. The brigs HMS Lady Franklin and HMS Sophia under William Penny sailed at the same time.

At Beechey island they came upon the first winter quarters of Sir John Franklin. The objects here discovered were a large number of empty meat tins, the embankment of a house, workshops and other remains of a large establishment, and finally, the graves of three men belonging to the Erebus and Terror, which dated to the winter of 1845-46.

Beechey Island.jpg

To search from the west. HMS Investigator (Robert McClure), and HMS Enterprise (Richard Collinson), sailed to the Bering Straits via Cape Horn, by which time they had become separated. McClure passed through the Bering Strait and into the Beaufort Sea. He discovered and almost navigated Prince of Wales Strait (between Banks Island and Victoria Island), passing a first winter there. From the head of the strait (on foot over the ice) he realized that he had found a remaining link in the North West Passage. Thus it was established that there is a continuous passage by water from Baffin Bay to the Bering Strait, parallel with the coast of the American continent.

During the following summer, the Investigator sailed clockwise round Banks Island until he was beset in what McClure called the Bay of Mercy, wintering there in 1851-1852. Unable to escape, the expedition passed the next winter also there in 1852-1853.

A sledge party, led by Lieutenant Bedford Pym from HMS Resolute (Captain Henry Kellett), found McClure by following his sledge tracks. They were part of Sir Edward Belcher’s 1852 expedition and wintering on the opposite side of Melville Sound. The Investigator was abandoned and its crew walked the many miles over the frozen strait to the Resolute which then sailed eastwards to rejoin Belcher’s expedition. HMS Resolute was then beset at Beechey Island and abandoned, its crew and passengers returning home to England on the tender North Star.

McClure and his crew had spent four winters in the Arctic, but were the first to circumnavigate the Americas and transit the North West Passage, albeit partly by sledge and foot. For this McClure received a £10,000 reward, and McClure Sound was named after him.

The 1852-1854 Search by Belcher

Sir Edward Belcher in overall command of HMS Assistance, HMS Resolute, HMS Intrepid, HMS Pioneer and the tender North Star set out to search Lancaster Sound, and push further westwards to assist Robert McClure.

The westward expedition of Belcher made a number of explorations in the general direction toward Melville Island. They found no traces of Franklin, but fortunately succeeded in finding and rescuing McClure and his ship's company, who had been beset in the ice for three years since the summer of 1850. Subsequently, all ships, except the North Star, were beset in the ice off Beechey Island and abandoned in 1854, although the Resolute was later salvaged.

The crews sailed home on their only remaining ship, the North Star (Allen Young) and HMS Phoenix (Edward Inglefield) which had been sent to support them. They lost a further ship, the barque Breadalbane (accompanying the Phoenix) which was crushed by ice and sunk 20 August 1853.

Belcher was court marshalled for abandoning his ships, but acquitted.

The 1853-1854 Search by Rae

In 1854, Dr. John Rae, while surveying the Boothia Peninsula for the Hudson Bay Company, discovered the true fate of Franklin party from talking to Inuit hunters, who told him of a party of 35 to 40 white men who had died of starvation near the mouth of the Back River. Other Inuit confirmed this story, which included reports of cannibalism among the dying men.

The Inuit showed Rae many objects that were identified as having belonged to Franklin and his men. In particular, Rae bought from the Inuit several silver forks and spoons later identified as belonging to Franklin, Fitzjames, Crozier, and Robert Osmer Sargent, a mate aboard Erebus. Rae's report was sent to the Admiralty, which in October 1854 urged the HBC to send an expedition down the Back River to search for other signs of Franklin and his men.

Part of the report (which caused considerable controversy upon its publication) is transcribed below.

“April 1854. In the spring, four winters past (i.e. in 1850), while some Inuit families were killing seals near the shore of a large island identified on Arrowsmith's charts as King William's Land, about forty white men were seen traveling in company southward over the ice and dragging a boat and sledges with them. By signs they lead the Inuit to believe that the men’s ship, or ships, had been crushed by the ice, and that they were now heading south, where they expected to find deer to shoot. From the appearance of the men (all of whom, with the exception of a single officer, were hauling on the drag ropes of the sledge and were looking thin) the party seemed to be running short of provisions, and they purchased a small seal or piece of seal meat from the natives. The officer in charge was described as being a tall, stout, middle-aged man. When their day's journey terminated, the men pitched tents.

At a later date the same season the bodies of some thirty persons and some graves were discovered on the continent (Adelaide Peninsular), and five dead bodies on an island near it (Montreal Island), about a long day's journey to the north west of a large stream, which can be no other than Great Fish River (Back River). Some of the bodies had been buried; some were in a tent or tents; others under the boat, which had been turned over to form a shelter, and several lay scattered about in different directions. Of those found on the Island one was supposed to have been an Officer, as he had a telescope strapped over his shoulders and his double-barrel gun lay beneath him.

From the mutilated state of many of the bodies and the contents of the kettles, it is evident that they had been driven to cannibalism as a means of prolonging existence. A few of the unfortunate men must have survived until the arrival of wildfowl, as shots were heard, and fresh bones and feathers of geese were noticed near the sad event. There must have been a number of watches, compasses, telescopes, guns (several double-barreled), etc., all of which appear to have been broken up, as I saw pieces of these different articles with the Inuit, and, together with some silver spoons and forks, purchased as many as I could get.”

John Rae’s survey of the west coast Boothia proved that it was a peninsular and that King William Land was in fact an island. The stretch of water between them is now known as Rae Strait. Rae and his men were awarded £10,000 for ascertaining the fate of Franklin’s expedition.

Despite the findings of Rae, the Admiralty did not plan another search as it had become involved in the Crimean War. Instead, based on Rae’s report, they commissioned the Hudson Bay Company to search the Back River area.

Britain officially declared the crews deceased in service on 31 March 1854.

The 1855 Search by Stewart and Anderson

James Anderson and HBC employee James Stewart traveled north by canoe to the mouth of the Back River. In July 1855, a band of Inuit told them of a group of "whites" who had starved to death along the coast. In August, Anderson and Stewart found a piece of wood inscribed with "Erebus" and another that said "Mr. Stanley" (surgeon aboard Erebus) on Montreal Island in Chantrey Inlet, where the Back River meets the sea.

The 1857-1859 Search by McClintock

Lady Franklin, after failing to convince the government to fund another search, personally commissioned, with public subscriptions and Admiralty support, one more expedition under Francis Leopold McClintock. The expedition ship, the steam schooner Fox, with Allen Young as ship's master, sailed from Aberdeen on 2 July 1857 to search the King William Island area.

McClintock met a party of the local Inuit. They told him of two ships being crushed in the ice and they gave him buttons, needles, knives and part of a gold chain that had belonged to Franklin's crew. An old Inuit woman told McClintock that she had seen European men who “fell down and died as they walked along”.

In April 1859, sledge parties set out from Fox to search on King William Island. On 5 May, the party led by Royal Navy Lieutenant William Hobson found a document in a cairn. It contained two messages.

The first, dated 28 May 1847, said that Erebus and Terror had wintered in the ice off the northwest coast of King William Island and had wintered earlier at Beechey Island and circumnavigated Cornwallis Island.

The second message, dated 25 April 1848, was written in the margins of that same sheet of paper but in a different hand, reported that Erebus and Terror had been trapped in the ice for a year and a half and that the crew had abandoned the ships on 22 April. Twenty-four officers and crew had died, including Franklin on 11 June 1847. The survivors planned to start out the next day for the Back River.

They also found a human skeleton on the southern coast of King William Island. Still clothed, it was searched, and some papers were found, including a seaman's certificate for Chief Petty Officer Henry Peglar, Captain of the Foretop, HMS Terror. However, since the uniform was that of a ship's steward, it is more likely that the body was that of Thomas Armitage, gun-room steward on HMS Terror and a shipmate of Peglar, whose papers he carried.

At another site on the western extreme of the island, Hobson discovered a boat containing two skeletons and relics from the Franklin expedition. In the boat was a large amount of abandoned equipment, including boots, handkerchiefs, soap, sponges, slippers, hair combs, and many books, among them a copy of The Vicar of Wakefield.

Meeting no more of the Inuit nor further traces of the lost voyagers, and feeling certain that the whole expedition had perished, McClintock returned to his vessel, carrying a great number of relics, many of which had been purchased from the Inuit.

McClintock returned to England with his discoveries and wrote an account of his expedition in a book entitled “The Voyage of the Fox in Arctic Seas”

His expedition had completed the delineation of the north shore of the American continent; determined the previously unknown outline of Boothia and the coast of King William Island; proved the navigability of Bellot strait; and opened a new channel extending northwest from Victoria Strait to Melville Sound, named McClintock Channel at the suggestion of Lady Franklin.

The Message from the Cairn

Cairn Note.jpg

Message 1 full text:

“28 of May. 1847. H.M. ships Erebus and Terror.

Wintered in the ice in lat. 70° 5 N., lon. 98° 23' W.

Having wintered in 1846-'7 at Beechey island in lat. 74° 43' 28" N., lon. 91° 39' 15" W. After having ascended Wellington channel to lat. 77° and returned by the W. side of Cornwallis island.

Sir John Franklin commanding the expedition. All well.

Party consisting of 2 officers and 6 men left the ships on Monday, 24th May, 1847.

Wm. Gore, Lieut.; Chas. F. Des Vœux. Mate.”

Message 2 full text:

“April 25 1848. H.M. ships Terror and Erebus were deserted on the 22d April, 5 leagues N. N. W. of this, having been beset since 12th Sept. 1846.

The officers and crews, consisting of 105 souls, under the command of Captain F. R. M. Crozier. landed here - in lat. 69° 87' 42", lon. 98° 4' 15".

This paper was found by Lt. Irving under the cairn supposed to have been built by Sir James Ross in 1831, 4 miles to the northward, where it had been deposited by the late Commander Gore in June, 1847.

Sir James Ross's pillar has not however been found, and the paper has been transferred to this position, which is that in which Sir J. Ross's pillar was erected.

Sir John Franklin died on the 11th June, 1847, and the total loss by deaths in the expedition has been to this date 9 officers and 15 men.

James Fitzjames. Captain F. E. M. Crozier, H. M. S. Erebus. Captain and senior offr.

and start on to-morrow, 26th, for Back's Fish River.”


The Later 19th Century Searches

The searches from 1848 to 1859 had found just about all there was to find about the fate of the Franklin expedition. Later searches added to the Inuit testimony and artifacts already found but did not throw any more light on the mystery.

1860-1862 Charles Francis Hall, Baffin Island, Henry Grinnell

1864-1869 Charles Francis Hall, King William Island and Melville Peninsular, Private

1875 Allen Young, Beechey Island and Peel Sound, Private

1878-1880 Frederick Schwatke, King William Island, American Geographical Society

The 1864-1869 search by Charles Francis Hall found a skeleton on King William Island which he took back to the USA. It was identified as that of Lieutenant Henry Le Vesconte (HNS Erebus) and was sent to England in 1873 and is now interred in the Franklin monument in the Chapel of the Old Royal Naval College, Greenwich.

The 1878-1880 Schwatke search found the grave of Lieutenant John Irving (HMS Terror) and the Admiralty arranged for the remains to be brought back to Scotland and buried in Edinburgh.

Le Vesconte.jpg

John Irving.jpg

The investigations of the 20th century will appear in part 3.

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[emason]

The Franklin Expedition to the Arctic 1845–1848 (Part 3)


Twentieth Century Investigations

After the discoveries of the search expeditions of the nineteenth century there seemed little left to discover except answers to questions, such as “What really happened?” and “Where are the expedition records?” By finding the records it was hoped that the first question would be answered.

The investigations after 1900 were launched mainly to try to answer these questions.

1923 Knud Rasmussen, KWI, Private
1930 Lauchan Burwash, KWI. Canadian government
1945 Paddy Gibson and William Skinner, KWI, Hudson Bay Company
1967 Project Franklin, KWI, Canadian Armed Forces (to find Franklin’s grave)
1982 Owen Beattie, Beechey Island.
1993 Barry Ranford, KWI, Private
2008 Robert Grenier – to find ships by sonar, Parks Canada

The investigations before 1980 were trying to find physical evidence and, apart from finding a few more relics and skeletons, failed to add anything of significance that threw any new light on the mystery.

After 1980 the investigations were more of a scientific nature, examining in detail discoveries already made.


The 1982 study by Owen Beattie.

This concentrated on the three graves on Beechey Island first discovered by the Austin expedition of 1850. The purpose was to exhume the bodies embalmed in the permafrost and perform necropsies upon them. The project was undertaken over a period of 10 years.

The first to be exhumed was a stoker on HMS Terror, John Torrington aged 20, who had died on 1 January 1846. The body proved to be well preserved after 138 years. It was emaciated and weighed less than 40 kg, showing that Torrington must have lost a lot of weight since leaving England. His hands showed no evidence that he had been a stoker, and this suggested that he had been too ill to work long before he died. The lungs showed pleural adhesions, anthracosis, emphysema and evidence of tuberculosis. Death was attributed to pneumonia. Analysis of his bones showed lead levels of 110-151 ppm. The lead level in the terminal part of his scalp hair was more than 600 ppm but was slightly less in hair nearer the scalp, suggesting that his lead intake diminished during the last weeks of life when he was seriously ill.

The next was John Hartnell, a petty officer on HMS Erebus, who had died on 4 January 1846 at the age of 25. When his clothes were cut off it was clear that a previous necropsy had been carried out, probably in 1846 on board the Erebus by Dr Goodsir, the assistant-surgeon. The corpse had a body mass index of only 14. Harkness had died of pulmonary tuberculosis.

The third and last was Royal Marine William Baine, aged 32, who had died on 3 April 1846. This corpse was also emaciated, weighing less than 40 kg. There were many superficial tooth marks which were thought to have been caused by rats that had tried to eat the body while it was still on board ship. The lungs showed evidence of tuberculosis but no organisms were cultured. Lead levels in samples of Baine's hair were 145-280 ppm. X-rays showed collapse of the eleventh thoracic vertebra due to tuberculosis (Pott's disease).

Although the deaths were primarily due to pneumonia and tuberculosis it was the body lead content which caused the most interest. The lead content was attributed to the poor sealing of the canned meat, with the lead seams exposed to the contents thus contaminating them.


The 1993 study by Barry Ranford

The primary purpose was to excavate, analyse and interpret a site at Erebus Bay on King William Island where a large deposit of human bone had been found the year before.

Over 300 bones were recovered and analysed. They came from eleven individuals and when tested showed a high lead content. Over 90 bones had post mortem cut marks consistent with cannibalism. This confirmed Dr. Rae’s report of 1854.


The Lead Poisoning Theory

The effects of lead poisoning are severe. At lead levels found in the bodies, symptoms include: malaise, forgetfulness, irritability, lethargy, headache, fatigue, dizziness, weakness, vomiting, convulsions, coma, and death.

Lead poisoning is a popular theory used in explaining the demise of the Franklin expedition, and the canned food a prime suspect. But the expedition took only 2% of the total tinned provisions supplied to the Royal Navy. Only about 10% of the food on board the Erebus and Terror was in tins. The entire Royal Navy ate foods from the same tins without suffering. So logically the tinned food could not be the cause.

Also, in very low temperatures, at about zero degrees Celsius, chemical reactions drastically slow down, thus reducing the ability of the lead dissolving into the tin’s contents. Tests done on food found in lead lined cans kept at normal temperatures for 120 years showed only marginal lead contamination.

While the tinned food may have contained some lead, it seems overwhelmingly probable that the Franklin Expedition suffered severe lead poisoning not from tinned food but from their ships’ water systems.

For this expedition, HMS Erebus and HMS Terror had unique water systems which, given the materials in use at the time, almost certainly produced drinking water very high in lead.

Lead was the universal material for plumbing hot and cold water piping at the time. It is reasonable to assume that the plumbers who fitted the water systems to the ships would have incorporated substantial amounts of lead piping and lead soldered joints.

By the time warm, distilled water emerged from distillation system, it had been in contact with freshly installed lead pipes and lead solder. These are the ideal conditions to maximise the absorption of lead by water. All these conditions applied to these installations in HMS Erebus and HMS Terror. They were new and unique and, given the materials used at the time, it is difficult to see how they could not have produced water with a heavy lead content.

Bone from every crew member so far analysed, almost 25% of the crews of both ships, shows that they definitely suffered from a massive and sustained intake of lead while on the Franklin Expedition. It is unlikely they ingested all this lead from tinned food, and other ships’ crews eating similar food did not suffer significant lead poisoning.


Causes of Death

The deaths did not have a single cause. Rather it was a combination of many factors, any one of which, ultimately, could cause death.

Lead poisoning has already been mentioned.

Tuberculosis (or consumption as it was called then) was rampant in the nineteenth century and the conditions on Erebus and Terror would have fostered its spread among the crew. All three of the Beechey Island bodies showed they suffered from this, and it was the cause of death in two of them. There is every reason to believe that the rest of the crew suffered proportionately.

The symptoms of tuberculosis are not apparent until the disease has reached the lungs, they then include coughing, breathlessness, weight loss, lack of appetite, fever and fatigue.

Scurvy was supposedly eliminated by the mid nineteenth century, but analysis of the skeletons found evidence of the disease in the majority. So why would it have occurred in the crew, despite each man allegedly receiving one ounce of lemon juice daily? Ascorbic acid is an unstable substance and prolonged storage may have impaired its function. It is possible that the lemon juice began to ferment and was boiled to prevent this, which would have destroyed the ascorbic acid. Starvation for a lengthy period can also lead to scurvy.

The symptoms of scurvy include lethargy, muscle and joint pain, swollen and bleeding gums, loosening of teeth, wounds failing to heal, jaundice and convulsions.

Hyperthermia, although not usually mentioned as a cause of death among Franklin analysts, must have claimed many a crew member already weakened by disease and hunger, mainly because of the environment and the several years spent in it, under less than ideal conditions. After they abandoned the ships, the last survivors had spent several years in the open air, without shelter in continuous sub-zero conditions with little means of providing warmth. Also, the clothing for the majority of the crew was for shipboard living and survival, it was not intended to make lengthy land expeditions as the ships primary purpose was find a sea passage to the west.

Symptoms of hyperthermia include, inability to think, confusion, memory loss, drowsiness, loss of control of hands, feet and limbs, unconsciousness.


Starvation, undoubtedly, affected everyone in the end, even if they somehow managed to survive lead poisoning, tuberculosis, scurvy and hyperthermia. When they abandoned the ships to go to the Back River, they had been on board the three years for which they had supplies of food. Half of any remainder was lost when one of the ships (Erebus?) sank. King William Island is devoid of vegetation and wildlife, so it was not possible to replenish their food stocks. Even the Inuit avoid KWI except in the summer time.

The results of starvation include lethargy, fatigue, apathy, scurvy, heart failure, and finally death.


The Franklin Expedition Muster Roll

HMS Erebus

Officers
Sir John Franklin Captain, Commanding the Expedition
James Fitzjames Commander
Graham Gore Lieutenant
Henry Le Vesconte Lieutenant
James Walter Fairholme Lieutenant
Robert Orme Sergeant Mate
Charles Frederick Des Voeux Mate
Edward Couch Mate
Henry Foster Collins Second Master
James Reid Ice Master
Stephen Samuel Stanley Surgeon
Harry D.S. Goodsir Assistant Surgeon
Charles Hamilton Osmer Purser

Warrant Officers
John Gregory, Engineer
Thomas Terry, Boatswain
John Weekes, Carpenter

Petty Officers
John Murray, Sailmaker, age 43
William Smith, Blacksmith, age 28
Thomas Burt, Armorer, age 22
James W. Brown, Caulker, age 28
Francis Dunn, Caulker's Mate, age 25
Thomas Watson, Carpenter's Mate, age 40
Samuel Brown, Boatswain's Mate, age 27
Richard Wall, Ship's Cook, age 45
James Rigden, Captain's Coxwain, age 32
William Bell, Quartermaster, age 36
Daniel Arthur, Quartermaster, age 35
John Downing, Quartermaster
Robert Sinclair, Captain of the Foretop, age 25
John Sullivan, Captain of the Maintop, age 28
Phillip Reddington, Captain of the Forecastle, age 28
Joseph Andrews, Captain of the Hold, age 35
Edmund Hoar, Captain's Steward, age 23
John Bridgens, Subordinate Officers' Steward, age 26
Richard Aylmore, Gunroom Steward, age 24
William Fowler, Purser's Steward, age 26
John Cowie, Stoker
Thomas Plater, Stoker

Able Seamen
George Thompson, age 27
John Hartnell, age 25
John Stickland, age 24
Thomas Hartnell, age 23
William Orren, age 34
William Closson, age 25
Charles Coombs, age 28
John Morfin, age 25
Charles Best, age 23
Thomas McConvey, age 24
Henry Lloyd, age 26
Thomas Work, age 41
Robert Ferrier, age 29
Josephus Geater, age 32
Thomas Tadman, age 28
Abraham Seeley, age 34
Francis Pocock, age 24
Robert Johns, age 24
William Mark, age 24

Royal Marines
David Bryant, Sergeant, age 31
Alexander Pearson, Corporal, age 30
Robert Hopcraft, Private, age 38
William Pilkington, Private, age 28
William Braine, Private, age 31
Joseph Healey, Private, age 29
William Reed, Private, age 28

Boys
George Chambers, age18
David Young, age18


HMS Terror

Officers
Francis Rawden Moira Crozier, Captain
Edward Little, Lieutenant
George Henry Hodgson, Lieutenant
John Irving, Lieutenant
Frederick John Hornby, Mate
Robert Thomas, Mate
Giles Alexander McBean, Second Master
Thomas Blanky, Ice Master
John Smart Peddie, Surgeon
Alexander McDonald, Assistant Surgeon
E.J. Helpman, Clerk in Charge

Warrant Officers
James Thompson, Engineer
John Lane, Boatswain
Thomas Honey, Carpenter

Petty Officers
Thomas Johnson, Boatswain's Mate, age 28
Alexander Wilson, Carpenter's Mate, age 27
Reuben Male, Captain of the Forecastle, age 27
David McDonald, Quartermaster, age 45
John Kenley, Quartermaster
William Rhodes, Quartermaster, age 31
Thomas Darlington, Caulker, age 29
Samuel Honey, Blacksmith, age 22
John Torrington, Leading Stoker, age 19
John Diggle, Cook, age 36
John Wilson, Captain's Coxwain, age 33
Thomas R. Farr, Captain of the Maintop, age 32
Harry Peglar, Captain of the Foretop, age 37
William Goddard, Captain of the Hold, age 39
Cornelius Hickey, Caulker's Mate, age 24
Thomas Jopson, Captain's Steward, age 27
Thomas Armitage, Gun-room Steward, age 40
William Gibson, Subordinate Officers' Steward, age 22
Edward Genge, Subordinate Officers' Steward, age 21
Luke Smith, Stoker, age 27
William Johnson, Stoker, age 45

Able Seamen
George J. Cann, age 23
William Strong, age 22
David Sims, age 24
John Bailey, age 21
William Jerry, age 29
Henry Sait, age 23
Alexander Berry, age 32
John Handford, age 28
John Bates, age 24
Samuel Crispe, age 24
Charles Johnson, age 28
William Shanks, age 29
David Leys, age 37
William Sinclair, age 30
Goerge Kinnaird, age23
Edwin Lawrence, age 30
Magnus Manson, age 28
James Walker, age 29
William Wentzall, age 33

Royal Marines
Solomon Tozer, Sergeant, age 34
William Hedges, Corporal, age 30
William Heather, Private, age 37
Henry Wilkes, Private, age 28
John Hammond, Private, age 32
James Daly, Private, age 30

Boys
Robert Golding, age 19
Thomas Evans, age 18

-----"-----

"Monument to Franklin"
by Nicholas Mitchell

"Along the waste, still, stark in death,
Bleaching beneath that freezing sky,
Where none e'er soothed their parting breath,
The "heroes of discovery" lie.
We crown war's valiant sons with bays,
And give the fallen chief to fame;
Shall we for these no trophy raise,
Or weave no wreath for Franklin's name?

Sleep, Martyrs of discovery, sleep!
Your winding-sheets the Polar snows;
What though the cold wind o'er ye sweep,
And on your graves no flowret blows,
Your memories long shall flourish fair,
Your story to the world proclaim
What dauntless British hearts can dare;
Sleep! lost ones, sleep! embalmed in fame."

-----"-----

(continued . . . )

[emason]

The Franklin Expedition to the Arctic 1845-1848 (Part 4)

In the previous three articles I have tried to present the known facts, or what is generally accepted to be the facts, of Franklin’s lost expedition, omitting opinion, theory and controversy. In this article I will try to piece together the evidence and produce a cohesive account, or reconstruction, of the fate of the expedition. I have ignored previous opinions and theories by looking at the evidence alone.

Franklin knew that the north coastline of the Canadian mainland had been surveyed as far east as the Back River. He had himself, with John Richardson, mapped about 1000 miles of it in their 1825 expedition. From his own observations, he knew that the sea along this coast was ice free in summer as far as the Bering Strait. All he needed to do was to find a route from Lancaster Sound to this coastline to complete the discovery of the North West Passage.

In this he succeeded, but failed to complete the passage. Why he failed is still not fully understood, even after all the evidence gathered over the past 160 years. There have been many theories and hypotheses, misinformation, and blatant manipulation of facts to suit pet theories. There is a lot of fiction mixed with fact to confuse matters even further.

Why did Franklin become trapped in the ice?

Having got to K.W.I. why didn’t Franklin winter on the sheltered east cost which is nearly always ice-free in summer? Primarily because he thought it was a dead end, and the last thing he would want was to be crushed by the pressure of pack ice against the anvil of unmoving land and loosing his ships. This had happened in 1836 to the Terror (under Captain George Back) which was beset in the ice for 10 months and at one point was pushed 40 feet up the side of a cliff by the pressure of the ice. It was safer to winter in the open sea on the west side of K.W.I.

Franklin probably tried to get as far south as he could that summer, sailing past the west coast of K.W.I., aiming for waters he knew would become ice-free next summer. He did not know about the year round heavy pack ice being driven down the McClintock channel towards K.W.I.

For some reason he seemed to have been delayed, arriving late at K.W.I. in the short summer season. He probably lost more time picking his way slowly through the heavy pack ice disgorging from the McClintock Channel. These delays meant that he ran out of time to reach the southern coast of the Queen Maud Gulf and was caught in a freezing sea. As it happened, he was he caught (in the imaginary trap he avoided to the east of K.W.I.) between the mass of the pack ice driving down the McClintock Channel and the anvil of the north west coast of K.W.I.

Arctic explorers expected to become beset in the ice for up to ten months of the year. They also expected (or at least hoped) the ice would melt long enough in the summer to free them. Franklin would not have been worried about this, but had the misfortune to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. He encountered a couple of very cold years in which the ice did not melt, and was stuck where the pack ice is constantly being replenished from the McClintock Channel.

The attached image is a satellite photograph perfectly illustrating the above. What wouldn’t have Franklin given for just a glimpse if this?

Satellite KWI.jpg

Beset in the ice

The expedition ships were beset in the ice from 12 September 1846. Up until the time they were deserted, 19 months later on 22 April 1848, they conducted land expeditions (the first cairn note) and probably scientific observations. The expeditions were made by small parties of men pulling sledges (to carry supplies and equipment). It is not known how many were made, or how far they extended, but they may have gone far enough to establish that they were on an island, and not an extension of Boothia. If they had, they would have realized that their maps were in error, if they did not already know.


Why Were the Ships Deserted?

The decision to desert the ships was not one to be taken lightly. After all, they had been their home for three years, providing their only shelter and containing all their supplies. The decision would have been made long before they left to give time to prepare. For a start they needed extra sledges and tents for 105 men.

Remembering the ships were 5 leagues (15 nautical miles) from Victory Point on the coast, to transport everything over pack ice, with its jumbled floes and pressure ridges rising as high as 60 feet, must have taken months. A single journey with sledges from ship to shore and return could have taken a week or more. A huge amount of provisions of every description was unloaded and stashed at Victory Point, necessitating many journeys taking a long time.

So why did they leave? Probably a combination of any of the following:-

It may have been precipitated by ice pressure doing irreparable damage to the ships, and fear of them sinking when the ice melted. In which case, the decision would have been made for them.

After three years, the food and fuel for heating and cooking must have been well depleted, despite the reduced number of crew numbers. Twenty four men had died, twenty percent of the total. Not through starvation but mainly disease.

The main diseases were probably tuberculosis, and scurvy through living on preserved food for three years. They needed fresh food to combat scurvy, and lots of it to feed 105 men. K.W.I. was devoid of vegetation and wildlife, and the Back River seemed to offer the best chance of finding any in the coming Spring and Summer months. George Back, in his book, had spoken of deer, duck, hares, wolves and musk ox as being seen from the river, not to mention the fish in it.


The Trek to the Back River

After deserting the ships, Crozier and his men set off for the Back River (or Great Fish River) which is across the Simpson Strait on the Adelaide Peninsular of the mainland. This destination is usually explained as Crozier attempting to reach a Hudson Bay outpost by the Great Slave Lake via the Back River. This I believe to be completely without merit for the following:-

1. The Back River is 530 miles long, with another 200 miles overland to the Great Slave Lake.
2. There are eighty three sets of rapids along its length.
3. A single boat with its sledge weighed about 1400lbs unloaded (McClintock).
4. In their diseased, hungry and weakened state, the men were in no condition to undertake such an arduous journey.

Crozier would have been well aware of the hazards of such a journey. George Back describes his journey down the river in his 1836 book ”Arctic Land Expedition” which was probably in the ship's library and read by officers.

I believe that the Back River was their only destination and their objective was to stay there until either, they were rescued (the cairn note telling potential rescuers where they were), or they had recovered sufficiently to consider moving. In fact, they didn’t even make it that far! They got as far as the gruesomely named Starvation Cove and no further. The fact that no remains (skeletons, artifacts etc.) have been found south of the Chantry Inlet would seem to support this. (The Back River flows northwards into the Chantry Inlet.)


The Inuit Evidence

The Inuit have a great tradition of oral history which is remarkably accurate despite being retold many times to subsequent generations. Because they have no formal method of dating these stories (other than e.g. “four winters ago”), the stories told by the Inuit to Rae, Hall McClintock and others, lack a chronology and may not all relate to Franklin. It has been shown that some even refer to previous expeditions by John Ross and others.

Perhaps the most accurate dates have been ascertained by John Rae in his close questioning through an interpreter. Testimony was obtained by others through interpreters, some not always fully conversant with that particular Inuit dialect, thus compromising its accuracy.

The following can reasonably said to be true.

In 1850 some Inuit, while hunting seals on K.W.I., see 40 men walking south dragging a boat and sledges. From the appearance of the men the party seemed to be running short of provisions, and they purchased a small seal or piece of seal meat from the Inuit, telling them they were going to Back’s River to shoot deer.

Later the same season the bodies of some thirty persons and some graves were discovered on the Adelaide Peninsular at a place named Starvation Cove. This is the nearest to the Back River as they got. The men had starved to death, after resorting to cannibalism.

In 1850 the Inuit boarded an abandoned, icebound ship that had drifted south in Queen Maud Gulf and found the body of a large man on board. He had long teeth and was very heavy, taking five men to lift him. The ship later sank when the ice melted.

In 1851 Inuit hunters see four men still trying to head south on the Adelaide Peninsular. In another version, as reported to Charles Hall, they see only their tracks. They told him of two ships being crushed in the ice. They had seen one ship sink with great loss of provisions, which they thought was the reason the men came ashore.

An old Inuit woman told McClintock that she had seen white men who “fell down and died as they walked along”.


The Evidence Interpreted

Assuming all 105 men crossed the Simpson Strait to the mainland, and that is by no means a certainty, what happened next? I think that once there, they quickly discovered they could not hunt, fish or find enough food to sustain everyone. Consequently, over the next two years, at different times, parties returned to Victory Point to retrieve supplies previously off loaded from the ships, and possibly returned to the mainland.

Most of the human remains and artifacts found on K.W.I. are on the west and south coast; the route between Victory Point and the Simpson Strait crossing. There were graves and skeletons along both these coasts, showing that men died over the whole distance. The graves would be the earliest when the men were fit enough and had the will to bury the dead; the later ones were the skeletons of those who died as they fell and were left unburied by men too weak to do otherwise.

Franklin Relics Map 1.jpg

Key to the map: Letters in brackets refer to which explorers made the discovery.
"A" refers to James Anderson; "B" to L.T. Burwash; "R" to John Rae; "H" to Charles Francis Hall;,
"McC" to Leopold McClintock; "S" to Frederick Schwatka; "R" to Knud Rasmussen; "N" to Peter Norberg.
The chart classifies evidence into European (red) and Inuit (blue).


Unanswered Questions

Where is Franklin’s grave?
When Franklin died (11 June 1847) the ships were beset in the ice. Such an eminent man deserved a grand grave, after all the three graves on Beechey Island were of ordinary seamen and Franklin was a Knight of the Realm. But no trace of a grave has ever been found.

What happened to the daily reports?
While at sea, reports detailing the date and their position were to have been thrown overboard in sealed containers every day. Not one has ever been found.

Why were no messages left in cairns?
Cairns were the post boxes of the Arctic. They were large and located in conspicuous positions visible from the sea. It was customary to leave a brief note of your presence and destination for others following - just in case. (Always tell your mother where you are going!) The only two notes to have been found were those on K.W.I. One at least would have been expected on Beechey Island.

Where are the expedition records?
From the very start, the one thing most sought after was the expedition papers that would explain the Expedition's fate. Yet despite the fact that duplicate records, one for each ship, were ordered to be kept, not a single scrap of either has been found. The Inuit told McClintock that they had found some papers in a cairn and given them to their children as playthings.

What happened to the ships?
This has now been answered. Both ships drifted south in the ice and sank. The Erebus (found 2014) ended up in Wilmot and Crampton Bay, close to O’Reilly Island off the west coast of the Adelaide Peninsular, where the Inuit boarded her in 1850. The Terror (found 2016) drifted into the appropriately named Terror Bay on King William Island before sinking.

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[emason]

The Franklin Expedition to the Arctic 1845-1848 (Part 5)

Re-reading the Cairn Note

Cairn Note cropped.jpg

The First Message
“28 May 1847
HM Ships Erebus and Terror Wintered in the Ice in Lat 70°.05' N. Long 98°.23' W Having wintered in 1846-7 at Beechey Island in Lat 74°43'28"N. Long. 91°39'15"W. After having ascended Wellington Channel to Lat. 77° - and returned by the West side of Cornwallis Island.
Sir John Franklin commanding the expedition. All well.

Party consisting of 2 officers and 6 men left the ships on Monday 24th May 1847 ”

The note is dated 28 May 1847 and the position given was off KWI; yet it states that they overwintered at Beechey Island in 1846/47. This is clearly wrong as they can't have been in two places at the same time. The burials found on Beechey Island are dated January/April 1846, showing they were there for the 1845/46 winter.

If such a basic error as the date was made, it shows an element of confusion by the writer who may not have realised the ambiguity of his writing. The wording appears to suggest that Cornwallis Island was sailed around before overwintering on Beechey Island. But it is quite possible to read the note in a different way to mean it was in 1846 that Cornwallis Island was sailed around.

The 'A' of "After" is capitalised, implying the start of a new sentence. It seems likely that the note was written to show a chronological order of events, i.e. overwintering then around Cornwallis Island.

[Note: The cairn note does not say 'circumnavigate'. It states only "having ascended Wellington Channel to Lat. 77° - and returned by the West side of Cornwallis Island" ]

When did Franklin sail around Cornwallis Island?

It is generally assumed from the cairn note than Franklin sailed around Cornwallis Island after transiting Lancaster Sound in 1845 before overwintering on Beechey Island. Unless Franklin disobeyed his orders, 1846 is the more probable.

From his orders:-
". . . and in proceeding to the westward, therefore, you will not stop to examine any openings either to the northward or southward in that Strait, but continue to push to the westward without loss of time, in the latitude of about 74 ¼ degrees, till you have reached the longitude of that portion of the land on which Cape Walker is situated, or about 98 degrees west. From that point we desire that every effort be used to endeavour to penetrate to the southward and the westward in a course as direct towards Bhering's Strait as the position and extent of the ice, or the existence of land, at present unknown, may admit."

His orders are quite clear. Franklin, after entering Lancaster Sound, was to make a dash westward, ignoring any openings to the north or south, initially to Cape Walker then west and south as condititions allowed. We don't know how far west he achieved, but we do know he returned to overwinter on Beechey Island 1845/46.
[Note: Cape Walker is the most westerly named place on the south side of the Parry Channel.]

Stanford repro 1858 map - crop.jpg

From his orders:-
" . . . when passing the mouth of the Strait, between Devon and Cornwallis Islands, you had observed that it was open and clear of ice ; . . . and if you should have determined to winter in that neighbourhood, it will be a matter of your mature deliberation whether in the ensuing season you would proceed by the above-mentioned Strait, or whether you would persevere to the south-westward, according to the former directions."

In other words, it would be Franklin's choice after overwintering, whether to investigate the Wellington Channel in the ensuing season, i.e the summer of 1846.

Although his orders gave Franklin freedom to make some decisions based on weather and ice conditions, it would have been unthinkable for him to have disobeyed his direct written orders to sail westward as far as he could in 1845.

So it can be taken that he did just that, returning to overwinter on Beechey Island, and it was in the next year 1846, that he entered the Wellington Channel and sailed north until ice blocked further progress at 77° north, returning southwards down the west side of Cornwallis Island, thus completing its circumnavigation.

ExpeditionMap2 modified.jpg

Why does it matter in which year the circumnavigation was completed?
For historical accuracy and, if done in 1846, it could explain why it appeared to take Franklin the entire summer of 1846 to sail from Beechey Island to KWI (a distance of only about 320 nautical miles). Sailing around Cornwallis Island would have added about another 400 nautical miles.

These extra miles could explain the expedition's late arrival at KWI in September 1846 which caused the ships to be caught too far north and trapped in a freezing sea which didn't melt for the next two summers. Another 100 miles or so south, or a few more days sailing, could have made all the difference.

-----"-----

How did Franklin get to King William Island?

The 1845 map (see above) shows no southward passage west of Prince Regents Inlet - just as William Parry wrote in his 1821 Journal of a Voyage for Discovery of a North-West Passage:
"Having now traced the ice the whole way from the longitude of 114° to that of 90° without discovering any opening to encourage a hope of penetrating it to the southward, I could not entertain the slightest doubt, that there no longer remained a possibility of effecting our object with the present resources of the Expedition;"

That Franklin made it as far as K.W.I. in 1846 there is no doubt. But how did he get there? Looking at any post 1860 map, it can be seen that there are three possible routes from the Parry Channel: McClintock Channel; Peel Sound; and Bellot Strait via Prince Regent Inlet - none of which were known in 1846. They are, from west to east:

1. McClintock Channel, separating Prince of Wales Island from Victoria Island (discovered 1857 by Leopold McClintock), but is almost permanently blocked by heavy pack ice, so can be discounted.

2. Peel Sound, separating Prince of Wales Island from Somerset Island (discovered 1848 by James Clark Ross). Peel Sound (with its southern end called the Franklin Strait) is generally assumed to be the way Franklin went, but is frequently blocked by ice, making it an unlikely route.
(A 1985 scientific study of Arctic climate in the Franklin era from the analysis of ice cores concludes that: " . . . c) a maximum of one year in five with open water in the Peel Sound-Franklin Strait-Victoria Strait area; d) frequent summers experiencing little or no breakup of sea ice along some portion of Franklin's route. In other words, conditions were considerably worse than modern normal and, in fact, the Franklin Era appears to have been one of the least favourable periods in the past 700 years. "

Of course 1846 may have been that one year in five when Peel Sound was open along its full length for long enough to allow passage. If so, Franklin was fortunate, otherwise there is only one other southern route:

3. Bellot Strait via Prince Regent Inlet.
Franklin himself, in his last letter from Disko Bay to his friend Dr John Richardson, favoured Prince Regent Inlet. Writing about the the possibility of a north-west passage, he says:
" . . . I admit with you that Regent's Inlet seems to be the most certain way of attaining that point . . . "

Franklin had an Arrowsmith map (see map below) which showed neither the Mclintock Channel nor Peel Sound, but it did show a possible 'southern channel' from the Gulf of Boothia to the Simpson Strait which may have encouraged him to search for it. It looked an obvious route to try; it was the most direct and was begging to be explored as a possibility.

Bentley 1843 Map.jpg

Possibly Franklin did try this route, and discovered the Bellot Strait (between Somerset Island and the Boothia Peninsular), either on his way south or possibly northwards, returning along the coast from his fruitless search for a non existent 'southern channel'.

Whichever route Franklin took, he was the first. So it can be argued that it was Franklin who was the first to discover a route for the North West Passage, but was unfortunate to be trappped in the ice and unable to complete his voyage. That honour falls to Roald Amundsen who, in 1903 sailed through the Bellot Strait and round the east side of King William Island, then westwards through the Simpson Strait and onwards to the Beaufort Sea.

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[emason]

The Franklin Expedition to the Arctic 1845-1848 (Part 6)

The expedition maps and errors

Franklin took with him the latest maps specially engraved for the Admiralty by the firm of John Arrowsmith. These had been updated with information from John Ross’s expedition of 1829, George Back’s of 1833 and Dease and Simpson’s of 1837. Unfortunately, both Ross and Back had made errors and assumptions which may have contributed to the expedition's unfortunate fate.

John Ross in 1829 while exploring the east side of the Boothia Peninsular with his nephew James Clark Ross, undertook several land expeditions, including one led by James Clark Ross to the west side of Boothia and King William Island which, because he was traveling over frozen land and water, did not recognize as an island and called it King William Land, joined to Boothia by a wide isthmus, forming the southern end of the James Ross Strait at a place he called Poet's (Poctus) Bay. And thus it was marked on the Arrowsmith map complete with imaginary capes and bays.

Arrowsmith 1851 Poets Bay.jpg

Ross was dogmatic, made assumptions presented as facts, and often wrong in his claims. Apart from the "Poets Bay" claim, he assumed and stated that there was no access to a North West Passage either from Prince Regents Inlet or anywhere south of 74° north.

From his 1835 book "Narrative of a second voyage in Search of the North-West Passage":
"I may now proceed to remark, that the results of my late expedition . . . . and in regard to the question of a north-west passage, it is fully established that there is none through Prince Regent's inlet, or to the southward of the latitude of 74° north."
(Despite having mapped much of the east coast of Boothia, he had missed the 2km wide entrance to the Bellot Strait, calling it Brentford Bay.)

But George Back, in his 1836 book "Narrative of the Arctic Land Expedition", disagreed.
"From these appearances the fact of the flood tide coming so far as I could judge from the westward the drift wood and the whale . . . . I think I am warranted in an opinion that the Esquimaux outline the sudden termination of Cape Hay and the clear sea in that particular direction are strong inferences in favour of the existence of a southern channel to Regent's Inlet."

Back had observed tidal flows in the Simpson Strait and reasoned that it had to go to and from somewhere. Because Ross had stated that KWI was part of the Boothia Peninsular, the flow could not be to the north, so the only possible outlet had to be to the east and the Gulf of Boothia via a "Southern Channel".

We now know that both were wrong, but what was a mapmaker at the time to make of these opposing opinions? Arrowsmith's solution was to fudge it and show the disputed area on his 1843 map as dotted lines labelled as 'supposed'. (see attached map)

Bentley Arrowsmith 1843.jpg

These were the maps Franklin had to work with. If he had known that K.W.I. was an island, instead of attempting to pass by its west side, he might well have chosen to avoid the pack ice disgorging from the McClintock Channel and overwintered on its more sheltered east side. Had he done so, it is quite possible the fate that befell the expedition would have been avoided.

In 1847 John Rae of the Hudson Bay Company mapped the coast of the Gulf of Boothia and established there was no outlet for a southern channel there. As a result, the map was corrected and re-drawn in 1851, but still showed Poet's Bay.

Arrowsmith North America 1851 inset.jpg

It was corrected and re-drawn again when, in 1854 it was confirmed (again by John Rae) that K.W.I. was an island, separated from the Boothia Peninsular by the Rae Strait.

There were so many new discoveries being made at this time, mainly through the searches being made for Franklin, that maps of the Arctic were frequently being updated, and an 1860 Arrowsmith map looks quite different to the 1845 maps that were available to Franklin.

Arrowsmith Discoveries 1860 cropped.jpg

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[jbryce1437]

Many thanks for posting such a comprehensive report on the Franklin Expedition Bill, great work.

Jim